ONTOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVITY:
Selves, Persons, Organisms
International conference
1-3 September 2015, Saint-Petersburg, Russia

1 September 2015, Saint-Petersburg University, Petrovsky Hall

10.30 – 11.00 Conference Opening and Greetings
Danil Razeev (Saint-Petersburg University)
Greetings from the Conference Organizing Committee
String quartet “Primavera”

11.00 – 12.30 Alfred Mele (Florida State University, USA)
“Free Will and Neuroscience”

12.30 – 12.40 Break

12.40 – 13.20 Sofia Miguens (University of Porto, Portugal)
“Two ways of being unable to go wrong when encountering oneself (and what we can learn from them)”

13.20 – 14.00 Robert Clowes (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)
“Can Self be Extended by Technology? Some Consideration around Ownership, Responsibility and the Role of Others”

14.00 – 15.30 Lunch

15.30 – 16.10 Dina Mendonça (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)
“Emotional Depth and Self within a Situated Approach to Emotions”

16.10 – 16.50 Raul Hakli & Pekka Mäkelä (University of Helsinki, Finland)
“Planning group agents”

16.50 – 17.00 Break

17.00 – 17.40 Kaarlo Miller (University of Helsinki, Finland)
“Social Reasons for Action”

17.40 – 18.20 Matti Heinonen (University of Helsinki, Finland)
“Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Agency”
2 September 2015, Saint-Petersburg University, Petrovsky Hall

17.30 – 19.00 Poster session
Angelina Dmitrieva (Moscow State University, Russia) “Introspecting Introspection of Phenomenal I”
Ilya Kanaev (Moscow University for Humanities, Russia) “Personal Freedom and Social Structure”
Alexander Muss (Saint-Petersburg University, Russia) “The Cognitivist Golem: Fundamental Limitations of the Modeling Process”
Danil Razeev (Saint-Petersburg University, Russia) “Two Intuitions about Personal Identity”

3 September 2015, Saint-Petersburg University, Petrovsky Hall

10.00 – 11.30 Susan Schneider (The University of Connecticut, USA) “The Mind is not the Software of the Brain (Even if the Brain is Computational)”
11.30 – 12.10 Dmytro Sepetyi (Zaporizhzhya Medical University, Ukraine) “The Zombie Argument against Materialism: Problems of Interpretation and Defence”
12.10 – 12.20 Break
12.20 – 13.00 Igor Gasparov (Voronezh Medical Academy, Russia) “Emergent Dualism and the Challenge of Vagueness”
13.00 – 13.40 Dmitry Ivanov (Institute of Philosophy, RAS, Moscow) “Qualia as relational properties of represented objects”
13.40 – 15.00 Lunch
15.00 – 15.40 Jorge Gonçalves (New University of Lisbon, Portugal) “What I am and time”
15.40 – 16.20 Vasco Correia (New University of Lisbon, Portugal) “Present and Future Self: Mr Spock versus Homer Simpson”
16.20 – 16.30 Break
16.30 – 17.10 Maria Sekatskaya (Saint-Petersburg University, Russia) “Why Explanatory Gap is not Consciousness Specific”
17.10 – 17.50 Caio Novaes (New University of Lisbon, Portugal) “Ontological Workout: Ethnographic Insights and Enactive Approach”
Abstracts

Alfred Mele (Florida State University, USA)
Free Will and Neuroscience

A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief that conscious decisions and intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions. I present three serious problems encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to existing neuroscientific data. Experiments using three different kinds of technology are discussed: EEG, fMRI, and depth electrodes.

Sofia Miguens (University of Porto, Portugal)
‘Where Am I, or What?’ Two Ways of Being Unable to Go Wrong When Encountering Oneself (and What We Can Learn from Them)

In this talk I compare two views of the subjective: D. Davidson’s account of first-person authority (Davidson, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1989) and S. Gallagher’s phenomenology-inspired account of immunity to error through misidentification in proprioception (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2010; Gallagher, 2012). While Davidson focuses on the fact that I cannot (in general) be wrong that I mean what I mean when I say what I mean, Gallagher is interested in the fact that I cannot be wrong (in general) in proprioceptively identifying myself as myself. Although neither Davidson nor Gallagher believe in looking inward when looking for ‘Myself’, their respective focuses on language and on perceptual awareness lead them in quite different directions. Based on Eilan (2013) I end by drawing some conclusions from this difference.

Robert Clowes (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)
Can Self be Extended by Technology? Some Consideration around Ownership, Responsibility and the Role of Others

Clark & Chalmers (1998) famous thought experiment involving Otto and his notebook demonstrated some reasons to suspect that certain uses of artefacts could become so intimate to the cognitive process that they were
better counted as parts of our minds. Our increasingly intimate usage of mobile digital technologies such as smart-phones, iPads and more exotically Google Glass (Clowes, 2012) suggest that certain contemporary digital technologies easily meet the original “trust and glue” conditions suggested to limn the boundaries of the extended mind (Chalmers, 2007). Perhaps too easily. In the context of ubiquitous internet, data centric applications and personalised gadgetry, the original conditions seem to lead to suggest cognitive bloat; to the point perhaps of a reductio ad absurdum of the original claims.

Sterelny (Sterelny, 2010) has argued that technologies should additionally meet conditions of personalisation and entrenchment to count. Only if we personally customise technologies to ourselves and then develop cognitive processes around those customisations, should they count as part of our personal cognitive processes. In the absence of meeting these conditions, Sterelny claims, it is better to think of such technology as cognitive niches, or scaffolding or part of a cognitive commons (Dror & Harnad, 2008).

I have argued even very customised and heavily relied upon technology may not allow us to have the right sort of epistemic responsibility for our gadgetry to count as part of our minds (Clowes, 2015). In part, these considerations turn on the socially entangled nature of much of the new media and gadgetry which might otherwise count as mind extenders (Clowes, 2013).

Both of these dimensions, I will argue, suggest that our use of technology requires a certain sort of mineness, in order to count as part of our minds. This bring us back to central issues of what are, and should be the limits of self. The conditions for counting technology as part of an extended self, while possible, are much harder to fulfil than are generally credited. These considerations, in turn, may help us better understand why it is so difficult to set convincing conditions for what should count as parts of one’s extended mind.

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Dina Mendonça (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Emotional Depth and Self within a Situated Approach to Emotions

The paper shows that the Situated Approach to Emotions indicates a way to better understand the notion of emotional depth. The first part puts forward what has been said about emotional depth pointing out the connection established by Pugmire (2005) about depth of emotion and excellence of character. Given the crucial connection of emotional depth to self-identity the paper puts forward some of the insightful gain of holding a situated approach to emotions, identifying some of the various ways in which emotional depth is present in a situation. In the second part, the paper examines the way depth can better be understood within a narrative, because it provides a structure to describe how persons distinguish deep and shallow in various situations both in the events as in the selves within the situated whole. Finally, the paper points out how emotional depth provides a further understanding of emotional norms and insights into shared emotions.
References:


**Raimo Tuomela (University of Helsinki, Finland)**

*Thinking and Acting in the We-Mode in a Group*

To think (e.g. to have an attitude) and act in the we-mode is, firstly, to think and act fully as a group member. This represents a general mode of thinking and acting, viz. to act ‘we-mode-ly’, purporting to serve the
group’s interests. For instance a person’s attitudes can be in the conceptually group-based we-mode or in the individualistic I-mode. As such the mode can be conceptually separated from the attitude content. The mode in the present sense is a broader notion than the Brentanoan intentional mode (that concerns e.g. wanting, intending, believing, etc.; e.g. one can want something either in the we-mode or in the I-mode).

In my talk I present and argue for three central criteria for a group member’s attitude or action being in the we-mode. Let us concentrate on the attitude case here and assume that the group attitude is a group’s goal. These criteria demand, first, that a we-mode attitude or action be based on a group-based reason for taking part in the group’s attitude or action; second, the person in question is required to participate in the group members’ collective commitment to having and satisfying the attitude (or, in the action case, of performing his part of the group’s action); third, the group member are as it were ‘in the same boat’ concerning the satisfaction of the attitude (e.g. goal) in question. (My talk spells out this condition in technical terms).

The members of a we-mode group ought to function in the we-mode, and they are assumed to accept and ‘construct’ the group’s attitudes (preferences, goals, intentions, beliefs, etc.) as their group’s attitudes, e.g. ‘this is our jointly accepted goal’, where the ‘we’ involved is collective, non-distributive ‘we’.

Raul Hakli and Pekka Mäkelä (University of Helsinki, Finland)

Planning Group Agents

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions play a major role in deliberation of rational agents. Since Bratman’s (1987) influential book, future-directed intentions have been understood as closely related to plans. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game theory has been recently put forth by the theory of team reasoning (see, e.g., Bacharach, 2006) in which the agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary
act. In the case of planning, the larger unit is the temporally extended plan. In the case of team reasoning, the larger unit is the multi-agent collective act. Thus, team reasoning and planning can be seen to be intimately related forms of decision-making: team reasoning is momentary planning across individuals, and planning is individual team reasoning over points of time. In so far as one individual’s component in the larger unit does not necessarily maximize expected utility, the method of selecting actions on the basis of the evaluation of the larger unit, clashes with game theory and decision theory. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Michael Bratman (2014) has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. Raimo Tuomela (2013) has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning almost completely in this context.

We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency. We will take the first steps to that direction by sketching the main features of an account of planning group agency.

Kaarlo Miller (University of Helsinki, Finland)

Social Reasons for Action

I first briefly give a general account of the notion “reason for action”, and I distinguish between external and internal reasons. Next I will turn to social reasons for the formation of the group intention and to reasons for acting according to it. When discussing social reasons, the central role is given to the notion of group intention (we-intention). On the one hand, it serves as a proximate reason for group members to perform their parts of the joint action, but on the other hand the members usually have further social reasons for their group intentions. We could say that questions of collective reasonability concern the weighing and choosing between collective ends, whereas questions of collective rationality concern the criteria of choosing means, given a fixed collective end, and these two notions are compared with respect to their relation to collective acceptance. Given that the group intentions (we-intentions) are the
members’ reasons for performing their parts, what kind of social reasons do these we-intenders have for these we-intentions? For example, given that the agent’s proximate reason for choosing her component action is group preference, viz. she intends to choose as her action her component in the group-preferred outcome, we can further ask why she chooses her component in the group-preferred outcome. And, furthermore, does she have to have a further reason for choosing her component in the group-preferred outcome? Or did she choose because, say, she was disposed to “identify with the group” and this disposition together with the prevailing circumstances triggered her choice without her having any further reason for her choice? Or shall we say that the “real” reason for her choosing her component in the group-preferred outcome was that she wanted to comply with the expectations of her fellow members? It is often argued that the above types of reason accounts of her choice are incompatible, but I will argue that in normal cases they are complementary. They are not on a par, however, and they, at least in typical cases, form a hierarchical structure of reasons.

Matti Heinonen (University of Helsinki, Finland)

Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Agency

This paper distinguishes two versions of the contribution made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in relation to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. According to the complementarity version of the minimalist approach, the minimalists analyze a different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. According to the constitution version of the minimalist approach, the minimalists expose the mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, while established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action focus on the stages of deliberation and decision-making preceding joint action. Drawing on Bechtel and Richardson’s approach to the heuristics of decomposition and localization, I argue that these two versions of the minimalist program are built on different methodological presuppositions, and that they should accordingly be regarded as separate projects, rather than two sides of one and the same undertaking.
Susan Schneider (The University of Connecticut, USA)

*The Mind is not the Software of the Brain*
*(Even if the Brain is Computational)*

Cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind often say that “the mind is the software of the brain” and relatedly, that “the mind is the program the brain runs”. Is the mind really a program? The task of this presentation is to dismantle the software model of the mind and a related view that says that we can survive brain uploading and other forms of radical brain enhancement because our “informational pattern” or “software” survives. Computationalism needs a richer conception of the mind. Drawing from my critiques of physicalism, I offer a non-physicalist, monistic approach to the mind as an alternative to the software conception, and illustrate how it is compatible with computationalism.

Dmytro Sepetyi (Zaporizhzhya State Medical University, Ukraine)

*The Zombie Argument against Materialism: Problems of Interpretation and Defence*

The zombie argument is one of the most influential arguments—if not the most influential one—against materialism in the modern philosophy of mind. However, there are considerable problems with the interpretation and defense of the argument developed by its most prominent proponent David Chalmers in the articles following the initial exposition in *The Conscious Mind*. I argue that Chalmers' defense of the argument as based on the conceivability-to-possibility entailment fails because of circularity, and propose an alternative interpretation and defense that does without such an entailment.

Igor Gasparov (Voronezh Medical State University, Russia)

*Emergent Dualism and the Problem of Vagueness*

Emergent substance dualism (roughly, the view that the subject of conscious experiences that naturally arises from complex interactions between material particles, is nevertheless as such a new non–material entity) is often considered as a modern version of substance dualism and the most viable alternative to physicalism. In two recent papers, Dean
Zimmerman has argued that the vagueness of ordinary physical objects poses a challenge for “garden variety” materialism (roughly, the view that the subject of conscious experiences is identical with the brain or the whole human organism), and that emergent substance dualism can deal more successfully with the problem of vagueness. I will argue that emergent dualism is vulnerable to the problem of vagueness to the same extent as “garden variety” materialism is. Furthermore, I will argue that emergent substance dualism does not have any advantages in comparison with its classical counterpart.

Dmitry Ivanov (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Science)
Qualia as Relational Properties of Represented Objects

The problem of consciousness is the problem of providing naturalistic explanation of phenomenal aspects of our conscious experience. According to some philosophers, it is impossible to explain naturalistically phenomenal qualities of conscious experience, or qualia, because qualia are irreducible to physical or functional properties of our body. But the latter fact alone does not support the anti-naturalistic view on the nature of qualia. To establish this kind of anti-naturalism we should also demonstrate that qualia are intrinsic properties of mental states. Those philosophers who believe that qualia are intrinsic properties, as a rule, also hold the view that phenomenal qualities are special experiential properties of mental representations. Opponents of this view, appealing to transparency of consciousness, try to demonstrate that this approach to phenomenal qualities confuses qualities of the intentional objects of experience with qualities of the experience itself. It is not clear whether the phenomenon of transparency alone allows us to show that qualia are not intrinsic properties. I believe that to argue against anti-naturalists we also need to examine carefully the inverted spectrum arguments. If qualia are intrinsic properties then the inverted spectrum scenario must be conceivable. In this presentation I would like to demonstrate that this scenario is inconceivable.

Many philosophers believe that if qualia are not intrinsic properties then we should understand them as representational properties, probably as extrinsic (relational) properties of representational conscious states. To dismiss this view we can appeal to transparency of consciousness. It will help us to show that phenomenal qualities are not properties of conscious
states at all. Inconceivability of inverted spectrum scenario and transparency of conscious experience allow us to hold an externalist view on the nature of qualia and regard them as properties of represented objects. Objections can be raised against this externalist approach. For example, the inverted Earth argument aims to show shortcomings of this approach. But this argument doesn’t demonstrate that we cannot interpret qualia as relational properties of represented objects. Interpreting qualia in this way we can provide naturalistic explanation of consciousness. For example, this view can be compatible with such theory as enactivism.

Jorge Gonçalves (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

*What I Am and Time*

Here, I hold that the sense of self, “what I am”, has not only synchronic unity but also diachronic unity. I disagree with the position that holds that the phenomenal self is always appearing and disappearing against a background of unconsciousness. I also disagree with the position that selves are systems with pure potentiality to be self-conscious. These positions try to be a solution to the so called “bridge-problem”: if the stream of consciousness is sometimes interrupted than there will be several selves during the lifespan of a body; this runs against the intuition that it is the same self which is in the state of wakefulness, dream, or sleep. But those solutions are also counter-intuitive because they are attempts to resolve the problem out of the first person point of view. On the contrary, I consider it possible to defend the diachronic unity of the self within the first person point of view. The problem with the referred positions is that they conceive the phenomenal very similar to memory or to the physical. If the phenomenal is thought as something really different, the problem of the continuity between wakefulness, dream and sleep will be dissolved.

References:


Vasco Correia (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

*Present and Future Self: Mr. Spock versus Homer Simpson*

Theories of self-control tend to assume that it is rational to treat one’s “future self” on a par with one’s “present self”, and even to care about the future self’s best-interest as much as one cares about the present self, or at least proportionally to its remoteness in time (Elster 2007, Parfit 1984, Thaler & Sunstein 2008). This would explain why most people frequently abstain from immediate, smaller rewards (e.g. sex, drugs & rock n’ roll) for the sake of delayed, larger rewards (e.g. enjoy a good health, keep a job, secure a retirement pension). That being said, we all know that human beings often transgress this principle of rationality and succumb to temptations that compromise their Future Selves best-interest (weakness of will, procrastination, etc). In their best-selling book, Nudge, Thaler & Sunstein suggest that the reason for this is that our Present Self tends to make decisions in a reflected and analytical fashion, similarly to Mr. Spock of Star Trek, whereas our Future Self is more of a Homer Simpson, i.e. impulsive, lazy and unable to resist temptations.

In this paper, I begin by questioning the assumption that it is necessarily rational to care about one’s Future Self and to sacrifice immediate pleasures for the sake of long-term benefits. I argue that the notion of long-term well-being is akin to a subjective preference among others, rather than a universal principle of rationality. Second, I claim that for agents who do prefer to ensure their future self’s best-interest, the most efficient way to do so is “precommitment” with regard to certain goals, options and constraints. Finally, I highlight both the role and the importance of imagination—and particularly projections of one’s self-image and future joys (or burdens)—in the endeavor to stick to good resolutions and attain long-term goals—or, to put it more prosaically, in the process of trying to motivate Homer Simpson to listen a little more to Mr. Spock.
Maria Sekatskaya (Saint-Petersburg University, Russia)

Why Explanatory Gap is not Consciousness Specific

Joseph Levine’s explanatory gap intuition is often evoked to spell out the uniqueness of consciousness: there is something it is like to be conscious, and there is an explanatory gap between what science can tell about physical processes in your brain and what it is like to have your brain running those processes. I claim that Levine’s arguments do not suffice to prove that consciousness is inexplicable, because current naturalistic approaches to consciousness meet the criteria of Deductive Nomological Model of explanation. I also argue that the arguments by Joseph Levine derive their intuitive force from our ability to grasp the contents of our consciousness pre-theoretically and not from the defects of scientific approaches to consciousness. I conclude by an example from physics: just as there is an explanatory gap in scientific theories of consciousness, there can be an explanatory gap in physical theories of space. Therefore, the explanatory gap is not consciousness specific.

Caio Novaes (New University of Lisbon, Portugal)

Ontological Workout: Ethnographic Insights and Enactive Approach

Most of the contemporary unsolved questions about ontology of subjectivity lie in a domain of inquiry polarized between the “nature vs nurture” complex; and in this sense, an enactive approach may bring some interesting cues about how to relate cultural constructions with the way we use our inherited first tools (Mauss, 1934), i.e., our sensory-motor apparatus. The present theoretical framework is based upon a few assumptions:

- The intimate relation between social identity (Hall, 1996) and the narrative sense of self (Gallagher, 2005), which entails an ontological position by generating inter-subjective meaning through social normative order (Torrance and Froese, 2011);
- The unity between thought and movement, and, specifically, a deeper conceptual usage of the perception-action cycle, embedded with social and environmental contingencies - e.g. affordances – (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009);
- The relation between muscle tonus and attentional focus (Gallagher, 2005) puts a question mark on how different bodily techniques
shape perception; therefore identity – in its social and subjective feature – is embodied in multiple ways through the habitus (Bourdieu, 2002).

The scope of this communication is to present a conceptual and analytical insight of enactive approach along with embodied theory from anthropology in some ethnographic data (participant observation) about practices and the construction of habitus inside a health club. The ethnography – still a work in progress – focuses on embodiment in identity processes performed in a health club, through the analysis of two different emic features / ways of practice / mindsets to engage the world: flow power and will power, performed predominantly in pilates classes and traditional weight lifting. The analysis of those practices portrayed them as a contemporary technology of the self (Foucault, 1982), intermingled with traditional social markers (such as class, gender, and symbolic capital). I believe that this approach may contribute to highlight the need of enhanced qualitative parameters between movement and subjectivity, both in the symbolic and material domain, widening the current theoretical tendencies from the “bio-psychological individual” to include its social and material contingencies.

Angelina Dmitrieva (Moscow State University, Russia)

*Introspecting Introspection of Phenomenal I*

By the phenomenal I, or Self, or I-qualia I understand a general feeling or perception of being this person, with this personal traits and this character.

My thesis here will be that attempts to be skeptical about the possibility of introspecting phenomenal I are inevitably based on introspection—and in this very rare case the opacity of introspection is pretty accurate.

David Hume famously doubted our ability to introspect our Self in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, pointing out that when we introspect our mental states we never actually find something like the perception of I. We always find only “some particular perception or other, of heat or cold light or shade” (Hume, 1978, 252). It is clear from this piece that he relies on introspection at his skeptical attempts.

Modern philosophers are also being skeptical about the possibility of introspection of phenomenal I based on introspection itself. Let’s consider how Jesse Prinz finds his intuitions about the subject. Even though he also
uses other argumentative resources like data from neuroscience, it seems like the main resource of his intuitions is still introspection.

Prinz argues in *The Conscious Brain* that Hume’s statement, which was cited above, can be understood in a weak and a strong meaning. On a Prinz’s weak reading, “there are qualia corresponding to the I, but these are nothing above and beyond the qualities of perception, sensation, and emotion” (Prinz, 2012, 224). Prinz notes that in this interpretation I-qualia exist, but are reducible to other kinds of qualia—those particular perceptions he is talking about. On a Prinz’s stronger reading, “Hume’s thesis says that there are no I-qualia, whether reducible or not” (Ibid.). Therefore, we can’t reduce I-qualia to particular perceptions, because there is no essential I-qualia in any of them. Prinz resumes weak reading like reductive reading and strong reading like eliminitivist reading. Prinz stands for eliminitivist reading, trying, by mostly using introspection itself, to show that all attempts to save I-qualia by reducing them to other perceptions fail to do it. For example, he is considering Damasio’s attempt to reduce phenomenal I to feelings (Damasio, 1999), rooted in William James’s ideas, and Blanke and Metzinger’s attempt to reduce it to so called “feeling of ownership”. He denies these attempts by invoking introspection. For example, he points out that Blanke and Metzinger’s position presupposes that there is a relation between our perceptions, and this relation is the feeling of ownership, which supposedly gives us a “proto-self” (Blanke O., Metzinger T., 2009). But, as Prinz argues, the I-qualia cannot be a relation. At the same time it is impossible to suggest that I-qualia somehow exist in the separate perceptions. I think it is obvious that Prinz’s argument here mostly relies on introspection itself.

Paradoxically we get to know that introspection of phenomenal I is impossible through introspection itself.

References:

Ilya Kanaev (Moscow University for Humanities, Russia)

Personal Freedom and Social Structure

The consideration starts from the Oxford Dictionary definition: «Freedom is the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants… quality of being independent of fate or necessity». This is the most common understanding of freedom in modern Western world. The author uses the method of analogy to investigate this idea, making parallels with the world of animate creatures. There he finds two ways of interaction: parasitism and cooperation. Analyzing the definition of freedom given above, author claims that it is corrupted by parasitism, because it stresses only individual profit and avoids any reference with human duties as a member of society. Whereas a human being is a social being and all his instincts and intentions are interconnected with social structure he lives in. Moreover, cooperation is an objective necessity for self-contained ecosystem or organism: that is the society, the state or the humanity. Hence, the practical implementation of personal freedom is a possibility to take certain social role with all its rights and duties. Current social structure and personal qualities determine not only opportunities of a man, but his feeling of own freedom. Society is not a limitation of personal freedom, but the condition of its realization. Therefore, The Great Soviet Encyclopedia gives a definition of freedom that has much more truth than mentioned above: «Freedom is the human capacity to act in accordance with aims and interests, relying on a knowledge of objective necessity». The objective necessity is manifested in one’s own body and the environment: society for a man.

Further elaboration of these ideas can be found in author’s book: Ilya Kanaev. Unity of People and Personal Freedom. Moscow, 2015 (in English).

Alexander Muss (Saint-Petersburg University, Russia)

The Cognitivist Golem: Fundamental Limitations of the Modeling Process

There are about 60 years after the cognitive revolution – the rise of the approach that challenged philosophy in the way of studying human mind. There is a number of possible solutions, which are based on the ideas of
positivism, naturalism and empiricism (Simon, 1969). A number of cognitive scientists around the world are making experiments and they are using neurophysiological data and theories from biology in their interpretations. This research leads to making both theoretical and mathematical models of consciousness, mind and humanity (Fodor, 1982).

Today cognitive science goes beyond the connectionist’s scheme of cognition to the cognitive approach in various fields of human being. As a result of cognitive theories we have a number of cognitive models and ways of studying it. Monographs represent a number of metaphors (Baars, 1997), critics (Chalmers, 1996), and works that make connection between the origin of consciousness and the evolution (Dennet, 1992; Searle, 1992), but there is no conceptualized approach to human mind and consciousness itself. I would like to demonstrate that those difficulties come from the methodological basis of cognitive paradigm.

Firstly, all the empirical sciences, which are studying complex phenomena and use statistical method, meet the following limitation. P. Duhem (1906) claimed that beyond the pure mathematics there are more than two contrary alternatives, which could be tested by experiment. From this view I can suppose that our statistical apparatus in natural-science experiment is not enough for studying mind and consciousness.

Secondly, according to K. Popper (1963) empirical sciences always underestimate statements which underlie the choice of the studying object and current empirical phenomena. That statement could be addressed to the cognitive concept of information. According to Capurro and Hjørland (2003), there is very weak connection between the concept of information in the information sciences and in the cognitive science. Following this misunderstanding it could be harder to make a reduction from knowledge to the information process.

Thirdly, when we are trying to test one hypothesis more than once, we meet the multiple comparisons problem, when the number of tests increases the probability of false-positive observations. Maybe this could be not only in empirical, but in the theoretical field, when we are trying to connect different theories from different disciplines (e.g., biological and physical reductionism) like in the cognitive science.

Fourthly, more that 40 years ago some cognitive scientists (Neisser, 1976) thought that cognitive science has serious limits while studying cognitive processes beyond the research lab. Nowadays, there is a number of fieldwork studies, but the some of the cognitive theories based on the results of laboratory experiments with its low ecological validity.
To sum it up, from my point of view the methodological basis of cognitive science has a number of theoretical problems, which provide some principal limitations to modeling the processes of human mind and consciousness.

References:
Duhem P. (1906). La Théorie physique. Son objet, sa structure.

Danil Razeev (Saint-Petersburg University, Russia)

Two Intuitions about Personal Identity

In my poster presentation, I deal with the notions of a person and an organism. I consider our ordinary intuition that a person has a first-person perspective and claim that it is false. Using Wittgenstein's private language argument, it is possible to demonstrate that an organism is an entity that exists authentically and that has a first-person perspective. In contrast to an organism, a person is not a substantial notion, but a relational one, and is like other notions coming from our collective vocabulary such as family, group, nation. It is meaningless to speak about a person as having a subjective experience or a first-person perspective.
Organizing Committee of the Conference:

Maria Sekatskaya (Saint-Petersburg University), Chair of the Committee; Danil Razeev (Saint-Petersburg University); Sergei Levin (Higher School of Economics); Anastasia Kozyreva (Heidelberg University); Daria Chirva (Saint-Petersburg University), Secretary of the Committee.

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