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INTRODUCTION

Praised are You, O Lord our God, King of the Universe.
You fix the cycles of light and darkness;
You ordain the order of all creation.
In Your goodness the work of creation
Is continually renewed day by day."}

Genesis inspires us to recognize the handiwork of God with awe and wonder: “God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good. And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day” (Gn. 1:31). In imitation and praise of the Creator, we reflect on and rejoice in the gifts that are ours to share: “And on the seventh day God finished the work that he had done, and he rested on the seventh day from all the work that he had done. So God blessed the seventh day and hallowed it, because on it God rested from all the work that he had done in creation” (2: 2-3).

In Sabbath posture, we are granted both moments of grace and the occasional mystical moment. True mystics, it seems to me, are granted a brief and ecstatic encounter with God, and then spend the rest of their lives discerning the hidden meaning of that searing moment. Others of us, not mystics, but open to grace, sometimes feel the power of that grace in overwhelming ways. We, too, must spend the rest of our lives working out the meaning of those grace-filled moments. Our active minds and lives flow from that energy. Responding to such grace is, I believe, how the best college professors and true public servants are formed.

Perhaps St. Theresa of Avila, Doctor of the church, mystic and reformer, is a model for such people. Her mystical experience came when she was past forty years of age. God touched and seared her heart: “I saw an angel close by me, on my left side, in
bodily form. He was not large, but small of stature and most beautiful—his face burning, as if he were one of the highest angels, who seem to be all of fire. . . . I saw in his hand a long spear of gold, and at the iron’s point there seemed to be a little flame. He appeared to me to be thrusting it at times into my heart, and to pierce my very entrails; when he drew it out, he seemed to draw them out also, and to leave me all one fire with a great love of God.” Bernini’s seventeenth-century statue in Rome portrays this encounter. And a physician’s testimony, after Theresa’s death, reported that her heart was marked by a long, deep scar. The searing presence of God can be both comforting and terrifying. It demands first our undivided attention, and then our whole-hearted response.

Our response to God’s creative genius is to be creative ourselves. In his book entitled Creativity, Matthew Fox writes, “Creativity, when all is said and done, may be the best thing our species has going for it. . . . Creativity constitutes the very meaning of our being human and our powers of creativity distinguish us from other species.” We are summoned to the use of our imagination in all of Christian life. Thomas Aquinas prepares us for the use of our imagination and creativity. Thomas was convinced that God encourages us “an affirmative attitude toward nature” which, according to Ian G. Barbour, contributed to the rise of science. For Thomas, reason “is an important preamble to faith” because God is at least partially disclosed in the universe. In his Proofs for the Existence of God, Thomas uses reason to demonstrate that God must exist.

So, why do we serve or study? Why do we confer and write? What is literature for? What are books for? Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World, a sentimental and pious novel first published in 1850, provoked a reader in Philadelphia to write to Warner, who then used the pen name Elizabeth Wetherell, that her book gave him “exquisite pleasure.” But his highest praise was that it had “done me good,” making him “a wiser and better man—more strengthened to duty, more reconciled to suffering.” Both inquiry and education are about the business of salvation, so books and literature and all our efforts are directed to the pursuit of truth, and to moving and touching hearts. The French Saint John Baptist de LaSalle writes that “God wills not only that all come to the knowledge of truth, but also that all be saved.” According to De LaSalle, procuring salvation meant seeking the total well-being of each student, and this would begin with teachers seeking to touch the hearts of the students entrusted to them.
writes, "You carry out a work that requires you to touch hearts, but this you cannot do except by the Spirit of God."

That same Spirit prompts the diverse authors of this issue to address issues of enduring significance. Writing from Caldwell College in New Jersey, Sister Elizabeth Michael Boyle, O.P., offers "Art & Agnosticism: God's Partners in Revelation, A Poet Explores the Landscape of Faith and Doubt." Here is an ambitious undertaking: a theological reflection on Boyle's own personal experience of what John Paul II may have meant—in his 1996 "Letter to Artists"—when he wrote, "The church needs the arts not primarily to illustrate scripture or dogma but as a different and genuine source of theology."

In "The Earth is the Lord's (Ps 24:1)," Sister Dianne Bergant, CSA, of Chicago's Catholic Theological Union, looks to the time when the irresponsibility and impertinence of human self-centeredness will be replaced by a sense of respect and responsible stewardship, and the bottom line of monetary calculation of resources will give way to aesthetic contemplation of natural beauty, a contemplation not unlike that of Job: "I had heard of you by word of mouth, but now my eye has seen you" (42:5).

In his essay "Human Dignity and the Kingdom Of God: A Russian Theological Perspective (Vladimir Solov'ev)," my colleague at The College of St. Scholastica, Randall A. Poole, explores the universality of Russia's greatest philosopher as he considers his principal theme: human perfectibility. Dr. Poole also assisted in editing this issue; he is not just an accomplished scholar but meticulous in attending to editorial detail.

"Theological Challenges to Community Organizing," by Lee Stuart, offers the clear perspective of one who has had a hand in the transformation of the Bronx from dying embers to glowing hope. And from the halls of Congress, James Oberstar reflects on both faith and service in his contribution, "Faith And Values in the Public Arena: An American Catholic in Public Life."

All of these essays were first delivered as lectures in the "Here Comes Everybody" series to inaugurate and celebrate the establishment of the Braegelman Program of Catholic Studies at The College of St. Scholastica in Duluth, Minnesota. The series was made possible by a gift from an anonymous friend of The College of St. Scholastica to whom I here express the gratitude of all who have profited from that generosity. These essays are also part of a forthcoming volume soon to be published by University Press of America, _Here Comes Everybody: Catholic Studies in American Higher Education_, which I am editing.

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The authors gathered here, in and through their wide-ranging scholarly interests, begin to suggest something of the depth and breadth of the living Catholic Intellectual Tradition. They are leading the way in new and important discussions. We offer these essays in the hope that they reflect the goodness of the work of creation, which the Lord renews day by day.

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NOTES

1Weekday Prayer Book (New York: Rabbinical Assembly, 1962), 42.
3Ibid.
8Ibid., Meditation 43.3.
HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD: 
A RUSSIAN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(VLADIMIR SOLOV'EV)

Randall A. Poole

On Sunday, March 1, 1881, Tsar Alexander II of Russia, known as the "tsar-liberator" because he had emancipated Russia's serfs in 1861, was assassinated by terrorist revolutionaries who called themselves the People's Will. The first bomb, a type of home-made grenade, was thrown at the emperor's carriage and disabled it, but left Alexander unharmed. He insisted on walking back to the crowd to check on casualties. A second bomb exploded directly in front of him, blowing off his legs. He died within a few hours.

Later that month Vladimir Solov'ev, today widely regarded as Russia's greatest philosopher and famous already then despite his youth, gave a public speech in which he appealed to the new tsar, Alexander III, to show Christian mercy on the regicides who had killed his father. In particular, he asked that they be spared the death penalty, which he regarded as an unconscionable violation of human dignity. Solov'ev's plea was poorly received by both his audience, who in effect booed him, and by Alexander III, who when he heard of the speech ordered the philosopher to "refrain for a certain time" from lecturing in public. This was a mild measure, but Solov'ev felt it necessary to resign his positions at the Ministry of Public Education and St. Petersburg University. Thenceforth he lived as an independent scholar and publicist, devoting himself to writing. As for the terrorists and their fellow conspira-
tors: they were hanged, six altogether. It was the last public execution in Russia. The crowd was enormous, some eighty thousand. There was no proper drop to the scaffold, only stools that had to be kicked away and were too low for a quick kill. The executioner was drunk, as was common (and understandable), and botched the job. One of the terrorists had to be re-hanged. Though it is unlikely, it is nice to think that Solov’ev may have had some small influence in bringing such spectacles to an end.

LIFE AND WORKS

Vladimir Sergeevich Solov’ev was born in Moscow in 1853, the son of Sergei M. Solov’ev, the leading Russian historian of his generation. After receiving a classical gymnasium education, he graduated from Moscow University in 1873. In November of the following year he defended his master’s thesis, The Crisis of Western Philosophy: Against the Positivists, his first book. It anticipated the broader Russian revolt against positivism by about twenty years and made Solov’ev into something of a celebrity. He began lecturing at Moscow University, but in June 1875 went abroad for research on gnosticism and mysticism at the British Museum. There he had a mystical experience (his second) of Sophia, the Divine Wisdom, who directed him to travel to Egypt. In the desert he saw her again. Returning to Moscow in the summer of 1876, he resumed teaching and wrote his second book, Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge (1877). Within a year he moved to St. Petersburg to take a position in the Ministry of Public Education. In early 1878 he delivered his famous Lectures on Godmanhood to audiences of nearly a thousand that included Dostoevsky. In April 1880 the young philosopher defended a brilliant doctoral dissertation, Critique of Abstract Principles, and then began teaching at St. Petersburg University. “The author of four books in six years was twenty-seven years old,” as Paul Valliere observes.

These early works, all highly theoretical, advance the main outlines of Solov’ev’s philosophical system. It was a metaphysics of the “unity of all” (usedinstvo), which conceived the cosmos as the manifestation or “other” of the divine absolute in the process of its own becoming or self-realization. The unity of all, the return of (perfected) creation to the creator, was to be achieved through Godmanhood (bogochelowchesstvo), which refers to humanity’s divine potential and vocation, the ideal of our divine self-realization in and union with God. Human beings, created in the image and likeness of God, are called to actively work for this ideal, that

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is, for the Kingdom of God and universal transfiguration in the unity of all, in which all will be one in God. Humanity is the key link in this metaphysics of cosmic redemption, the mediating principle between God and world. The self-realization of each individual person is at the same time a step toward the divinization of the cosmos. Indeed the great theme of Solov'ëv’s philosophy is human perfectibility.9

Compared to the theoretical focus of his first four books, Solov'ëv's works in the 1880s took a somewhat different direction. They focused on various aspects of his project for establishing a worldwide “free theocracy,” which would reunify Eastern and Western Christianity under the spiritual authority of the Roman pontiff and the imperial dominion of the Russian tsar, all in preparation for the Kingdom of God on earth.10 Disappointment with Russia as the prospective agent of universal theocracy, and more generally with the external forms of his theocratic ideal, led Solov'ëv to return to philosophy proper in the 1890s. This period culminated with a major treatise on ethics and social philosophy, Justification of the Good (1897).11 His final work was Three Dialogues on War, Progress and the End of World History, with a Brief Tale of the Anti-Christ (1899-1900).12 He died on 31 July 1900.

GODMANHOOD AND THE MEANING OF ABSOLUTE HUMAN VALUE

The central idea of Solov'ëv’s philosophy is bogochelovechestvo, translated as Godmanhood, divine humanity, or the humanity of God. Bogochelovechestvo is an abstract noun formed from Bogochelovek, God-human or God-man, a name for Christ. The concept’s overall meaning is conveyed by the teaching of St. Athanasius and other church fathers that “God became man so that man might become God.”13 This formula consists of two key elements: kenoisis (the humanization of God in the incarnation) and theosis (the deification of man). The “humanity of God,” as Valliere translates bogochelovechestvo in his major study Modern Russian Theology,14 captures very nicely the kenotic and incarnational aspect. It concisely expresses the Christology of the Council of Chalcedon (451): In Christ two distinct natures, the divine and human, are united without “division or confusion” in one person. The human retains its distinct identity even alongside the divine, a clear vindication of its intrinsic worth. But the “humanity of God” does not work as well for the theotic aspect of Athanasius's formula, which was, I believe, the more important one for Solov'ëv. For him, bogochelovechestvo meant the divinity of humanity as much as the hu-

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manity of God. "Godmanhood" more readily suggests Solov'ëv's conception of God and man as ultimately one absolute, divine-human being: divinity that is also human (intrinsically and not only in the incarnation) and humanity that is also divine (by origin and vocation). Crucially, it also conveys the idea of a state that is to be achieved, in a way that neither the "humanity of God" nor "divine humanity" does.

Godmanhood was not an initial dogmatic premise for Solov'ëv, but rather the logical conclusion of sound philosophical method. His point of departure was not God but man, specifically human consciousness and morality. He believed that morality—our consciousness of absolute ideals and the capacity to act on them—is not only the most distinctive property of human beings but also our primary testimony to the ultimate nature of reality. Solov'ëv's method, proceeding up to the divine from analysis of the human, is brilliantly deployed from the very beginning of his famous Lectures on Godmanhood. In the first two lectures, he introduces important aspects of his philosophical anthropology by looking at the decline of religion and rise of secular humanism in modern European intellectual history. He contends, in particular, that contemporary European consciousness lacks a clear idea of the absolute and that this is reflected in its understanding of human nature. His remarks, though somewhat cursory, are highly revealing of his own approach to the problem of the absolute and the ground of human value.

First, Solov'ëv makes clear that religion is, or should be, about the absolute: "Religion is the connection of humanity and the world with the absolute principle and focus of all that exists. Clearly, if we admit the reality of such an absolute principle, it must determine all the interests and the whole content of human life and consciousness." These words were spoken by a mystic, someone whose whole life experience was permeated with absolute divine content, but the "pitiful thing" that was contemporary religion left Solov'ëv with little doubt that the absolute was far from the concerns of most educated Europeans.

At the same time he held that the absolute could not be eradicated altogether from human consciousness; we inevitably think in terms of absolutes and ideals. The issue is whether the absolute is consciously recognized, clearly represented, and concretely related to all aspects of human life, or rather disguised, distorted, and disfigured. Contemporary Western civilization, having abandoned the task of dealing with the absolute on its own terms, "is striving to substitute something for the rejected gods" (LDH, 2).
This unconscious religious striving has given rise to two powerful ideologies: socialism and positivism. As forms of modern humanism, both proclaim human dignity. In this Solov'ev recognizes their truth: they are right in thinking that human beings are absolute. But they are wrong in supposing that human beings can be absolute without the absolute, that we can be absolute in value while also being only facts among a multitude of other facts (LDH, 18-19). Thus Solov'ev's main criticism of modern humanism is that, in Valliere's formulation, it does not appreciate the implications of its basic assumption.18 Solov'ev draws out these implications and concludes that the very capacity to conceive of ourselves as absolute entails the reality of the absolute, i.e., a theistic metaphysics.

His underlying argument is that there is something radically "unnatural" about our self-conception and human consciousness in general. The idea of "absolute," present in our thought at all levels whether we consciously recognize it or not, is a striking anomaly in an empirical world of relative facts. Even evaluations such as the world as "empirical" and facts as "relative" demonstrate the inevitability of the absolute perspective of consciousness. It is the nature of the mind to evaluate, and in doing so we rely on absolute, ideal norms (LDH, 30). The data of empirical experience convey nothing of these ideals and norms. The upshot is that our capacity to evaluate—and to value ourselves as absolute—when experience confronts us with only facts, seems to indicate that the natural world is not the only one. In other words, the very idea of "absolute," as in our own self-conception, implies its reality. From this logic (more implicit than explicit in his text) Solov'ev draws a stark conclusion: "belief in oneself, belief in the human person, is at the same time belief in God" (LDH, 23).

There is another aspect to Solov'ev's understanding of absolute human value, one that goes to the heart of his concept of Godmanship. The Russian philosopher takes "absolute" quite literally. Absolute means that which cannot be surpassed or excelled. To say this of human beings is necessarily to equate our value with God's, which is precisely what Solov'ev does. He uses both "absolute" and "divine" to describe the value of human beings: "The human person . . . has absolute, divine significance" (LDH, 17). Since there can be no gradation at the level of absolute, human beings and God are equal in value. We are equally persons, or, in other words, all persons are divine, beginning with God. This divine-human equality has momentous implications. It alone makes possible genuine, free union between man and God.
Such a union would be impossible if the divine principle were purely external to humanity, if it were not rooted in human personhood itself. If it were not so rooted, our relationship to the divine principle could be only one of involuntary, fateful subordination. The free inner union between the absolute, divine principle and the human person is possible only because the latter also has absolute significance. The human person can unite with the divine principle freely, from within, only because the person is in a certain sense divine, or more precisely, participates in Divinity (LDH, 17).19

Human freedom relative to God is so important because it is the essential condition of the fuller realization of human divinity. Thus the human person "is in a certain sense divine" because our divinity is an intrinsic potential that must be freely, humanly realized, and this is impossible without divine-human equality. The realization of our divine potential rests on human autonomy, self-determination, and freedom of conscience. This is a highly distinctive aspect of Solov’ëv’s thought: the realization of our divinity depends on the proper exercise of our humanity.

THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN NATURE

Solov’ëv calls human consciousness of the absolute the divine, religious, or mystical principle in man. It is one of three principles in his overall conception of human nature. The other two are the material principle, by which human beings are part of the natural world, and rational freedom or autonomy (reason and morality), which is the distinctively human principle, the middle principle between the divine and material (LDH, 158). The human principle is the capacity for self-determination in the direction of either the material or the divine, the capacity to "become" more (or less) than we presently are, to infinitely perfect (or degrade) ourselves (LDH, 142). Solov’ëv sees the capability to "become" as distinctly human. Non-rational beings do not "become," they can only "be" what they are by nature; their natural capacities are realized over the course of their life by instinct, not self-determination. God, too, according to Solov’ëv, can only "be," in that he is already perfect. Only human beings (and in principle other free rational beings) are capable of "becoming," which, if directed toward the divine, takes the form of infinite self-perfection.20 The autonomous human element, as noted above, is an indispensable component of Godmanhood.
Solov'ëv introduces his tripartite conception of human nature in the last two *Lectures on Godmanhood*, as part of his Christology. His philosophical anthropology in effect extends the Chalcedonian dogma of the two natures of Jesus Christ to all human persons and even to all existence, with the divine nature thus becoming more an intrinsic potential that must be freely realized by the human. The possibility of such a free, human realization of the divine was vitiated by the Fall (in the first Adam), which enslaved human will to nature, but was restored by the incarnation (in the second Adam). In Jesus Christ,

the human principle, having placed itself in the proper relationship of voluntary subordination to, or harmony with, the divine principle as inner good, thereby once more receives the significance of the intermediary, uniting principle between God and nature. And nature, purified by the death on the cross, loses its material separateness and weight and becomes a direct expression and instrument of the Divine Spirit, a true spiritual body (LDH, 163).

But the human realization of the divine—our deification (theosis) and through us the spiritualization or divinization of the cosmos—while restored by Christ as a possibility, remains a task that we must actively work to accomplish. Otherwise the Kingdom of God, understood as deified humanity or Godmanhood, would have come with him. It is something we must take responsibility for and work toward as the goal of human progress, not something to be awaited from the external action of divine grace. Thus Solov'ëv's Christology revises mainstream Christian ideas of salvation since Augustine if not earlier: with Solov'ëv Christ does not so much save us as make it possible for us to save ourselves. For Russia's greatest religious philosopher, "salvation" largely meant the self-realization of our own intrinsic divinity.

The conception of human nature (divine-human-natural) that Solov'ëv introduced in *Lectures on Godmanhood* forms the basic philosophical framework of his subsequent works. In them he stresses that human autonomy, the middle principle and the condition of Godmanhood, is the ground of human dignity. In *Critique of Abstract Principles* he embraced Kant's conception of human autonomy and dignity, calling it the "essence of morality." For Solov'ëv the divine principle is not, by itself, the source of human dignity. The source is self-determination and perfectibility according to our consciousness of the absolute or divine. In *Lectures on Godmanhood*, he affirms absolute human value, human divinity, and
divine-human equality, but it is really autonomy, the self-realization of our intrinsic divine potential, the capacity to become divine (theosis), that is the core of human dignity. Were this realization externally rather than internally determined (heteronomously rather than autonomously), human dignity would be deprived of its basis. "Salvation" apart from human free will would violate human dignity or at any rate be accomplished past it. For this reason, the source of human dignity is not God but Godmanhood. This is the humanist thread that runs through Solov’ev’s philosophy.

Solov’ev was very concerned that human autonomy not be overwhelmed by the divine principle. This led him to downplay or reconceptualize the role of miracle, revelation, and dogma in religion, all of which, he feared, risked undermining true faith, autonomy, and self-determination by purporting to manifest the divine as if it were something external and knowable as a positive fact. He understood, with Dostoevsky, that miracles can enslave, impairing the free, human realization of the divine. This understanding shaped his Christology, which, as we have seen, is philosophical and universalistic. He maintained that “strictly speaking, the incarnation of Divinity is not miraculous, that is, it is not alien to the general order of being” (LDH, 157). In his 1891 speech “The Collapse of the Medieval Worldview,” he commented on Luke 9: 49-56 as follows: “James and John did not know the spirit of Christ, and they did not know it just because they believed above all in His external miraculous power. Such power there was, but it was not the essential thing.”

The Russian philosopher closest to Solov’ev, Evgenii Trubetskoi, expressed the spirit of his Christology in writing, remarkably, that “Christ’s complete sacrifice saves man not as sorcery from outside, but as spiritual influence liberating him from inside and transforming his nature only on the condition of the autonomous self-determination of his will.”

“FREE THEOCRACY” AND CHURCH UNION

For Solov’ev Godmanhood was necessarily a social and cultural project, since human perfectibility, the ever fuller realization and development of human potential, is inconceivable apart from society and history. This takes us to Solov’ev’s social philosophy, which he treats as a branch of moral philosophy (applied or “objective” ethics in contrast to pure or “subjective” ethics). He presented his moral philosophy (pure and applied) in Critique of Abstract Principles (his doctoral thesis) and then, in a revised and definitive version, Justification of the Good.

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Critique of Abstract Principles, written concurrently with Lectures on Godmanhood, is an indispensable exposition of Solov'yov's whole system. An "abstract principle" is one that is abstracted from and mistaken for the whole, whether the whole is person, society, or, ultimately, the "unity of all." Solov'yov shows how the material, human, and divine principles can each be abstracted or put in place of the whole. Even so, he is much less concerned with the dangers of rational autonomy (the human principle) being an abstract principle than of it not being firmly included in the whole, between the material and divine principles. The vision of the social whole that he lays out in his doctoral dissertation is "free theocracy," "free" precisely because it purports to respect human autonomy.

In Solov'yov's social philosophy, the principle of rational autonomy takes the form of law, based on recognition that human beings are persons, ends-in-themselves, and bearers of rights.\(^3\) In Valliere's felicitous expression, "law is grounded in metaphysical personhood (freedom and reason), the inalienable glory of the human being."\(^3\) The virtue of law, according to Solov'yov, is that it makes possible the realization of all higher potentials of human nature, for it is the very condition of civilized life and peaceful society. Law makes people equal in a way that they are not in the state of nature or in unlawful societies, where the strong brutalize the weak and themselves in the process. By equalizing human relations, law enables people to develop as persons. It is an essential spiritualizing force. This was Solov'yov's ultimate justification of law and, more generally, of "objective ethics."

Law is an essential but not the highest principle of Solov'yov's social philosophy. It deals with the means by which people pursue their ends, but not the ends themselves. Solov'yov was not satisfied with the liberal individualist response that people determine their own ends and pursue them within the limits of the law. He believed that society ought to have a positive content, a morally normative end that would unite its members. Meanwhile law divides them. In Critique of Abstract Principles, he wrote that the equality of all before the law actually means that "all are equally limited by law, or all equally limit each other; this means there is no inner or positive unity among them, only their correct division and demarcation."\(^3\) Only the divine or mystical principle in human nature, not law, can provide inner, positive unity among people. The philosopher provides a succinct formulation of his social ideal in the preface to his book. The ultimate moral significance of society, he writes,

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is determined by the religious or mystical principle in man, by virtue of which all members of society are not limits for each other, but rather internally fulfill each other in the free unity of spiritual love, which must be immediately realized in a spiritual society or the church. Thus the normative society has as its foundation a spiritual union or the church, which defines its absolute ends.\textsuperscript{33}

But the realization of the divine principle in society must be approached freely and consciously, it cannot be based on external clerical authority or blind faith, it must fully respect the human principle of rational autonomy, both in morality—where it takes the form of freedom of conscience—and law. “Thus the true, normative society must be defined as free theocracy.”\textsuperscript{34} It was the way to the realization of humanity’s divine potential (Godmanship).

Solov’ëv insists that free theocracy must respect the material and rational principles in human nature at both the individual and societal levels, our natural being and the economy as well as reason, self-determination, and law. Abstract clericalism or false theocracy (Islam and the medieval Catholic church are his main historical examples) suppresses all of them. It rejects the physical and natural element as sinful, preaching asceticism and mortification of the flesh. “In personal, inner life it suppresses the purely human or rational principle, the principle of reason and inner freedom or freedom of conscience,” Solov’ëv writes. Church power reigns over all spheres of reason. “Since God is understood only as an external being, alien to man and nature, it is clear that the revelation of such a God happens only in an external fact—in lightning and thunder, completely drowning out the quiet voice of reason and conscience.” At the societal level abstract clericalism externally rules over civil society and the economy, subordinating them and violently distorting their development.\textsuperscript{35}

In view of the historical record of theocracy, Solov’ëv was at pains to stress that his vision of “free theocracy” preserved human autonomy, the very condition of Godmanship. At the individual level the concept of autonomy means self-determination according to absolute ideals that are freely recognized by reason. It is the essence of the principle of freedom of conscience, which Solov’ëv championed both in his philosophical and publicistic works. At the societal level autonomy means that the relative independence of each component part is necessary for the integrity of the whole. In his formulation:
In normative society (free theocracy) all the various elements of society, all the aspects and spheres of social relations, are preserved and exist not as isolated spheres closed-off in themselves and irrelevant to each other, or as spheres striving for exclusive predominance, but as necessary component parts of one complex whole. . . . It is impossible here to have contradiction and exclusivity among these elements, for if they are all necessary for each other, then they also are all autonomous and yet dependent on each other.68

At the metaphysical level, the very concept of the “unity of all” assumes the relative autonomy of constituent parts. Authentic diversity and free development are conditions of genuine unity. Any oppressive or monistic unity, like any exclusive self-affirmation or anarchic particularism, is evil, false, and ugly.

The meaning of Solov’ev’s theocratic ideal has long vexed scholars. A society freely united in love of God, all of whose members seek to fulfill each other in that love, is one that has attained a vastly higher level of moral development than anything in Solov’ev’s day or ours. The Russian philosopher may have wanted to suggest that the Kingdom of God would not be possible until, at least, “free theocracy” was. Kostalevsky proposes, helpfully, that theocracy was both means and end: “For Soloviev, the aim (the abiding foundation) was theocracy in the sense of the Kingdom of God, while the means (the practical action) was theocracy in the sense of a form of society that is capable, due to its attained perfection, of entering into the Kingdom of God.”69

Solov’ev believed that free theocracy, both as means—the Christianization of life—and end—the final triumph of the Kingdom of God—rested on the reunification of the church. He devoted himself to this task—ecumenism, as it would come to be called—in the 1880s. His first and most important work laying out his conception of the church and ideal of church unity is “The Great Schism and Christian Politics” (1883).70 In it he applies his tripartite, Christological model of human nature to the church. Eastern Christianity represents the divine element, and Western Christianity the human, but the historical development of each element has been one-sided or “abstract,” to use the terminology of Critique of Abstract Principles. Orthodoxy took the divine without the human and approached it as an object of passive devotion rather than a matter of active practice and free human assimilation. Catholicism asserted the human in place of the divine and falsely represented it as the divine. The result was not the genuine autonomy of the human element but its despotism,

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the “false theocracy” of the medieval Roman church. The ideal of the church, in contrast to these historical distortions, is the free inner union of both the divine and human elements. “In Christ,” Solov’ev explains,

divinity was not a passive object of worship and contemplation for His human consciousness, but was inwardly united with His human will and acted through it, regenerating His physical nature. Likewise in the Church the divine essence or holiness must not be merely revered and worshipped but, united with the practical powers of man, must actively penetrate through them into all the elements of the world so as to sanctify and spiritualize them. The divine principle of the Church must not merely abide and be preserved in the world but rule the world,

which requires free human agency and cooperation, but not domination (77).

Rome was not wrong in exercising its human will and power in trying to create a worldwide theocracy; it was wrong in replacing these means for the end. Rome’s ultimate purpose, perfectly correct, was the Kingdom of God on earth; the means, also correct, were the church’s spiritual power. But, Solov’ev writes,

it was easy to lose sight of the fact that spiritual power only serves to prepare and lead mankind to God’s kingdom in which there no longer is any power or domination. The contemplative East sinned by not thinking at all of the practical means and conditions of carrying out God’s work on earth; the practical West erred in thinking of those means first and foremost and making them the end of its activity (82).

These contrasting approaches, and even more so the underlying cultural differences between East and West, not the *filioque* or unleavened bread, caused the great schism between Rome and Byzantium, traditionally dated at 1054. After that Byzantium eventually fell to Islam (1453) while Rome increasingly gave in to its “jealous love of power” (84).

It is interesting that Solov’ev does not condemn the Church of Rome’s supreme central authority, hierarchical order, and discipline. He says they were necessary practical means for its purpose of building the Kingdom of God on earth and even endorses the formula of the “Church militant” (86). But Rome forgot that papal power, governing only the human side of the church and its temporal militant organization, was a means, “conditioned by a
mystical reality, for carrying on God's work on earth" (89). The result of mistaking the means for the end was the peculiarly pernicious form of absolutism called papism. It perverted the idea of theocracy by giving it the character of compulsory domination. Papism betrayed the true idea of theocracy, that supreme authority belongs to spiritual, not secular power, and that it must be exercised by spiritual, moral means. Instead it tried to rule the world by worldly means, "reducing the Church to the level of the state, and the spiritual power to the level of the temporal" (91). From this Solov'ëv draws a striking conclusion: "The fault of papism was not that it exalted, but that it humiliated papal power" (92). Furthermore, the papist church, by reducing itself to the level of the state, deprived the secular world of its ideal and so of the possibility of assimilating the image of the true church. It thus deprived secular state and society of their model for inner Christianization, the true meaning of theocracy (91-92).

Papism's sin against individual freedom was even greater. Solov'ëv is referring here to the church's efforts to force people, through in some cases the most heinous forms of torture, to submit to itself as a condition of salvation. This was an attempt to coerce human conscience and will, a fruitless attempt by its very nature, "and thus all the more revolting." In exacting submission by external means," Solov'ëv continues, "ecclesiastical authority sought to deprive man of the power of moral self-determination," that is, of the very condition of "salvation" (Godmanhood). "By addressing itself not to man's moral powers but to his physical weakness the Church lost its moral superiority over individual minds and at the same time roused their just opposition," which took the form of Protestantism (93). This was a deeply moral protest, from the depths of human personhood, in defense of the inviolability of personal conscience and against "the tyranny of the spiritual power that had forgotten its spiritual character" (94). Protestantism affirmed that "man cannot be saved by compulsion," one of Solov'ëv's own deepest convictions (95).

Despite the "relative justification" of the main historical movements against Rome, the end result, Solov'ëv laments, is that the Christian world is divided and finds itself in its present "deplorable state." "True Christian life," he says, "will begin only when all free forces of humanity... voluntarily and conscientiously set to work upon all that medieval papism tried to achieve by violence and compulsion. That will be the end of the great schism and the beginning of Christian politics" (96). Thus the immediate aim of Christian politics or policy should be the re-

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establishment of church unity. Solov'ev believed that the papacy, having abandoned its former papism, would naturally head the reunited Christian church. As he made clear in works published over the next several years, he accepted not only the supremacy of the Roman see but also the Catholic dogmatic innovations of the filioque, immaculate conception, and papal infallibility, all of which he justified by the principle of "dogmatic development." But recognition of the supreme authority of the Roman pontiff would not mean "Romanization," for the reunited church will be truly universal, embracing and reconciling (without effacing) the distinctiveness of both its halves, Eastern and Western, and the divine and human principles corresponding to them. The universal church will then better conform to the truth of Godmanhood, bringing the divine and human principles, historically "abstracted" from each other in the Eastern and Western churches, into closer approximation to their complete unity in Christ.

The universal Christian church, understood as perfect divine-human union, already exists, of course, but as a transcendent, mystical unity. "The one holy, catholic and apostolic Church," Solov'ev writes, "essentially abides both in the East and in the West, and shall abide forever, in spite of the temporal hostility and division between the two halves of the Christian world" (98). Our task is to bring the earthly reality of the church into ever closer conformity with its mystical essence. In his words, "The essential unity of the universal Church, hidden from our eyes, must become manifest through the visible reunion of the two ecclesiastical communities divided in history, though indivisible in Christ" (100). The reunion and completion of the church will achieve "free theocracy." "Then the truth of Godmanhood, given to us in its inner essence, will also prove to be our own work and find embodiment in actual human life" (101).

Solov'ev had an operational plan to make his ecumenical vision a reality: Christendom was to be reunited by an alliance between the Russian emperor, Alexander III, and Pope Leo XIII. He championed this plan in his works and among Roman Catholic leaders whom he visited in central and western Europe. Nowhere, perhaps, is it more clear that Solov'ev the mystic had difficulty distinguishing between this world and the higher one. Pope Leo XIII had a clearer sense of the difference: when he learned of Solov'ev's plan he said it was a beautiful idea but impossible without a miracle. Surely it operates on a very different level than free theocracy as a philosophical ideal stipulating a
moral transformation so radical that it would bring humanity to the threshold of theosis.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE GOOD:
HUMAN PERFECTIBILITY IN THE IMAGE AND LIKENESS OF GOD

In the 1890s Solov’ev came to agree, it seems, with Leo’s verdict. He grew disillusioned with his practical (or so he had imagined) plans for theocracy, though never with the ideal itself. The great Russian famine of 1891-1892 was a turning point, convincing him of the huge gap between Russian reality and his theocratic ideal. He returned to the type of philosophical work that had engaged him a decade earlier. Justification of the Good, his magnum opus, appeared in 1897. By common consensus it is the most important Russian work of moral philosophy. Arguably it is one of the great modern works of ethics and religious philosophy more generally. It is Solov’ev’s most powerful and systematic defense of human dignity—the book’s overall theme.

Justification of the Good is divided into three parts, “The Good in Human Nature,” “The Good from God,” and “The Good through Human History.” In the first part Solov’ev applies the three principles of human nature to an analysis of moral experience, identifying three “primary data of morality”: shame, compassion, and reverence. Shame corresponds to the material principle in human nature, compassion to the purely human, and reverence to the divine. He regarded religious experience (reverence) as a very important component of moral experience, so much so that his overall conception is really moral-religious experience. Part II of Justification of the Good, “The Good from God,” develops this aspect of his moral philosophy. Throughout he emphasizes the immediacy and authenticity of our religious experience. “The reality of the Deity is not a deduction from religious experience but the content of it . . . God is in us, therefore He is.” This conviction in the veracity of moral-religious experience as testimony to the ultimate nature of reality is the foundation of his whole philosophy.

Solov’ev delineates the content of religious experience into three constituent elements: consciousness of God as absolute perfection, consciousness of our own imperfection, and conscious striving toward divine perfection. Our consciousness of divine perfection is the “image of God” in us and our striving to perfect ourselves according to that image is our “likeness” to God (145). This is a creative and powerful interpretation of the “image and likeness” verses (Genesis 1:26, 9:6); Solov’ev will often invoke it.
He also refers here (and on a number of occasions) to Matthew 5:48—"Be perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect"—but explains that the imperative can only be accomplished by the process of becoming perfect (perfectibility), so that "be perfect" actually means "become perfect" (147).

Russia's greatest religious philosopher now explicitly defines human dignity as consisting in our consciousness of absolute perfection (the image of God) and in our striving to perfect ourselves (the likeness of God) (152). He calls the image of God the power of representation (of absolute perfection) and the likeness of God the power of striving (to achieve it). This "double infinity" belongs to every person. "It is in this that the absolute significance, dignity, and worth of human personhood consist, and this is the basis of its inalienable rights" (176). Further, the human person contains an element of intrinsic value, "which can never be merely a means—namely, the possibility, inherent in it, of infinite perfection through contemplation of and union with the absolute fullness of being" (196). And in perhaps the most capacious lines from Justification of the Good, Solov'ëv writes, "The absolute value of man is based, as we know, upon the possibility inherent in his reason and his will of infinitely approaching perfection or, according to the patristic expression, the possibility of becoming divine (thesis)" (296).

Human autonomy, dignity and perfectibility are the conditions, we know, of Godmanhood or the Kingdom of God, which Solov'ëv defines here, in a pivotal chapter of Justification of the Good, as the "unconditional principle of morality": "participate, as fully as in thee lies, in the work of making thyself and everyone more perfect, so that the Kingdom of God may be finally revealed in the world" (152). The Kingdom of God, he says, cannot be expected by the immediate action of God. Indeed "God has never acted immediately"—a striking comment meant to reinforce the necessity of free human participation in God's work. Why, he asks, wasn't the Kingdom of God established long ago or from all eternity? "What was the need for all these centuries and millennia of human history," which will no doubt long continue (149)? The answer, clearly, is that the Kingdom of God must be humanly realized, through our self-determination toward the divine and the self-realization of our divine potential. His premise throughout is that an achieved perfection is greater than one that is bestowed."

In Part III of Justification of the Good, "The Good through Human History," Solov'ëv turns from "subjective ethics" to "objective ethics" (social philosophy), but without the emphasis on

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“free theocracy” of Critique of Abstract Principles. Again the fundamental principle is human dignity. It is the “moral norm of social life,” as he calls one of his chapters. The just society ought to recognize that each of its members has the right to a dignified or worthy existence, and it ought to materially provide, where necessary, for this right (296-298, 306). In this belief that the state ought to provide a certain minimum welfare for its members, in his protest against dehumanizing social conditions and concern for the poor and urban working class, Solov’ëv was a modern “new” liberal. His views on criminal justice, including his devastating critique of the death penalty, are also quite modern and entirely consistent with the “moral norm” of human dignity.

The gradual realization of human potential in history, the process of human perfectibility and striving toward Godmanhood, is called progress. This seems to be the very concept of the “justification of the good” and to explain why humanity was not created perfect and why the Kingdom of God is our task rather than God’s gift. (Were it merely a gift, it ought to have been given from the moment of creation, in order to prevent human evil.) That Godmanhood is an ideal to be achieved can only mean that perfectibility is itself the highest good, and so justifies the “absolute” good (God) for permitting (or enabling) the whole process. In other words, the justification of the good is a type of theodicy: perfectibility as the highest possible good justifies the costs (moral evil), although how must remain unfathomable to human minds (151-152).

Solov’ëv remained reluctant, even in Justification of the Good, to part with his ideal of “free theocracy,” although he scrupulously avoids the term itself. He calls not for separation of church and state but rather for their distinction, fearing that complete separation would lead to the conflation and usurpation of the functions of one by the other. He still spoke of a Christian state that recognizes “the supreme spiritual authority of the universal Church” (394), and even of the harmonious cooperation of prophet, priest, and king in working to bring about the Kingdom of God (401-403). These are good reasons to conclude, with Valliere, that, “for all its modernism and moderation, The Justification of the Good remains the work of a mystic, a prophet, and a Christian theocrat.”

CONCLUDING REMARKS

There is no doubt that Solov’ëv himself continued to recognize “the supreme spiritual authority of the universal Church,” in the mystical sense in which he understood it in his 1883 essay “The

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Great Schism and Christian Politics." In 1896 he received communion from a priest of the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church in Moscow. The meaning of this act is controversial, with some of his Catholic admirers interpreting it as his conversion to Roman Catholicism, especially since the philosopher first read aloud the Trent confession of faith. It seems reasonably clear, however, that for Solov'ëv it was only an affirmation that he saw himself as belonging to the one universal Church that transcended historical divisions.\(^{49}\) In other words, he did not feel himself bound by confessional requirements. A letter he wrote in 1892 effectively sums up the matter: "I am as far from the narrowness of Rome as from that of Byzantium, or Augsburg, or Geneva; the religion of the Holy Spirit which I profess is wider and at the same time fuller in content than all particular religions."

Yet Solov'ëv was steadfast in his conviction in the supremacy of the Holy see. In an 1896 letter he wrote that all Christians should unite around the "traditional center of unity—the see of Rome," explaining that, "this is all the more practicable because that center no longer possesses external compulsory power, and therefore everyone may unite with it to the extent indicated by conscience."\(^{50}\) While little remained of his messianic hope in Russia (and he had long deplored the sorry state of the Russian church), there is no indication that he suffered similar disappointment in the contemporary Church of Rome. Indeed Leo XIII's affirmation of the dignity of labor in his famous encyclical Rerum novarum (1891) was consonant with Solov'ëv's "social gospel" theology.\(^{51}\) The Russian religious philosopher would surely have welcomed the Second Vatican Council, perhaps especially its declaration on religious liberty, Dignitatis humanae (1965). The election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II would also likely have pleased him greatly, since he (Solov'ëv) regarded the Poles as a theocratic nation, together with the Russians and Jews. John Paul returned the compliment, as it were, by expressing his admiration for Solov'ëv in his encyclical Fides et ratio (1998).\(^{52}\) The pope's last word was reported to have been "Amen," as if to consummate a life dedicated to the work of the Lord. A century earlier Solov'ëv's last words were "hard is the work of the Lord."\(^{53}\) Our work, and it continues.

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'Философская наука таєтного змінства, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1, pp. 250-406. There is no English translation.


'Kritka otdelemykh nachal, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 2, pp. v-xvi, 1-397. There is no English translation.


'Solov'ev distinguishes between two poles of the absolute. The first is self-sufficient (God), the second is in the process of becoming (man), "and the full truth can be expressed by the word 'Godmanhood.'" Kritka otdelemykh nachal, pp. 515-524 (quotation at p. 523).

'It is the first of the "central teachings" identified by Jonathan Sutton in his The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov: Towards a Reassessment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

'His works of the period include Dukhovnoe ozero zhizni (1882-1884), translated as God, Man and the Church: The Spiritual Foundations of Life by Donald Attwater (London: James Clarke, 1988); "Veliki sporo i khristianskaia politika" ("The Great Schism and Christian Politics") (1883); "Evreisto i khristianskii vopros" ("The Jews and the Christian Problem") (1884); Istorii i budushchost' teokratii (The History and Future of Theocracy) (1887); L'Idee russe (1888); La Russie et l'Eglise universelle (1889), translated as Russia and the Universal Church by Herbert Rees (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1948); and Nacional'nye vopros v Rossii (The National Question in Russia), two vols. (1888, 1891).


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Konstantin Mochul’skii, Vladimir Solov’ev, Zhan’ i uchenie (Paris, 1951), p. 10, uses these two phrases together to gloss “bogocheloveches’vo.”

At times I will translate the Russian chelovek as man, because it captures the notion of both individual human beings and humanity as a whole, while “human being” generally means one person and “humanity” means the whole. “Human beings” works for “man” in many cases, but it would be awkward here.

Solovyov, Lectures on Divine Humanity, revised and ed. Boris Jakim, p. 1. Subsequent references to this work will be cited parenthetically as “LDH.”

Modern Russian Theology, p. 147.

In another formulation Solov’ev writes, “. . . Divinity belongs to human beings and to God, but with one difference: God possesses Divinity in eternal actuality, whereas human beings can only attain it” (LDH, 29).

He stresses this human capacity to "become" in many of his works. In Justification of the Good he calls it the "essentially human attribute" (Jakim edition, p. iv). In The Meaning of Love (1892-94) he writes that human consciousness is formed by "universal ideal norms" and a "sense of truth" by which we evaluate the phenomena and facts of life. “Considering his actions with this higher consciousness, man can infinitely perfect his life and nature without leaving the boundaries of human form. And therefore, he is indeed the supreme being of the natural world and the effective end of the world-creative process.” This essay is included in The Heart of Reality: Essays on Beauty, Love, and Ethics by V. S. Soloviov, ed. and trans. Vladimir Wozniuk (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), pp. 89-133 (quotation at p. 92). Also see “The Idea of a Superman,” in Politics, Law, and Morality. Essays by V. S. Soloviov, ed. and trans. Vladimir Wozniuk (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 255-263.


Orthodox theology in general has not drawn the sharp opposition between nature and grace that has characterized much of western Christian thought. See Vallerie, “Introduction to the Modern Orthodox Tradition” and “Vladimir Soloviev,” The Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature, vol. 1, pp. 508, 554. For Solov’ev, “grace” comes as human beings freely perfect themselves and is a result of that process. See, for example, Istoriia i budushchnost’ teokratii, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 4, pp. 337-342.

I would argue that Solov’ev’s philosophical anthropology does not rest on the Christian dogmas of a human nature corruped by the Fall and redeemed by Christ. One can simply take the three principles as a description of human nature and proceed from there. However, the triumph over and spiritualization of the flesh in the Passion and Resurrection of Christ is more distinctively Christian. Solov’ev himself calls it “the final and distinctive truth of Christianity.” Dukhovnye osnovy zhizni, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3, p. 375. Gustafson, “Soloviey’s Doctrine of Salvation,” pp. 36-38, provides a good, concise reading of this section of Lectures on Godmanhood, which Solov’ev largely repeats in The Spiritual Foundations of Life.

Kritika otvecheennykh nachal, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 2, p. 44. He closely paraphrases Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals at some length. In fact much of what he presents as a paraphrase is a direct translation of key passages from the Groundwork. Kritika otvecheennykh nachal, pp. 44-62.
This connection between human dignity and theosis is most explicit in *Justification of the Good* (see below).


One of the many places Solov’ev specifies his view that true faith cannot be coerced but rests on “the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1) is his essay “The Jews and the Christian Problem” (1884), which is translated in part in *A Solovyov Anthology*, ed. S. L. Frank (here, p. 112).

The speech is translated in *A Solovyov Anthology* (quotation at p. 62).


*Kritika uvelichennikh nachal*, pp. 139-140.


*Kritika uvelichennikh nachal*, p. 167.

*Kritika uvelichennikh nachal*, pp. viii-ix.

*Kritika uvelichennikh nachal*, p. ix.

*Kritika uvelichennikh nachal*, pp. 161-162.

*Kritika uvelichennikh nachal*, p. 185.

Kostalevsky, *Dostoevsky and Solov’ev*, p. 115. “Theocracy” is a poor term for the Kingdom of God. Although it literally means “the rule of God,” by firm historical association it connotes an earthly state in which power is exercised by the church. Thus one of E. N. Trubetskoi’s main criticisms of Solov’ev is that he introduced state power into the Kingdom of God, where it surely can have no place. Trubetskoi, *Mirosozertaniye VI S. Solov’eva*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1913), pp. 175, 567, 578. Solov’ev himself, however, stated that the Kingdom of God “is obviously incompatible with the state.” *Justification of the Good*, ed. Boris Jakim, p. 366. In his earlier essay “The Great Schism and Christian Politics” (1883) he said the same (see below). Valliere proposes that “theonomy” may be a better name than “theocracy” for Solov’ev’s ideal (“Vladimir Solov’ev,” pp. 550-551).

The essay is translated in part in *A Solovyov Anthology*, ed. S. L. Frank, pp. 75-101. Subsequent references cited parenthetically in the text. In places I have modified the translation.

See especially *La Russie et l’Église universelle* (1889).

He wrote an essay on this principle, “The Development of Dogma in the Church in Connection with the Question of Church Union” (1886). It is analyzed in Valliere, *Modern Russian Theology*, pp. 178-192.

It is not clear whether Solov’ev thought the re-establishment of church unity would actually be the Kingdom of God on earth (theosis and spiritualization) or the next step toward it. The position I have formulated in this sentence is the more conservative one.

Solov’ev was involved in organizing famine relief. E. N. Trubetskoi argued that Solov’ev’s disappointment with Russian state and society in the wake of the famine spurred the collapse, or at any rate marked de-utopianization, of his theocratic idea. *Mirosozertaniye VI S. Solov’eva*, vol. 2, pp. 3-88.

"Sutton, The Religious Philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, pp. 74-75, demonstrates that Solovyov was indebted to Schelling on this central point.

"Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, pp. 195-196, 203-205. The subtitle of Walicki's chapter on Solovyov is "Religious Philosophy and the Emergence of the 'New Liberalism.'" Also see Valliere, "Vladimir Solovyov," pp. 560-562.

"Perfection is not a thing which one person can make a gift of to another; it is an inner condition attainable through one's own experience alone" (180-181).

"Solovyov writes that in God there can be no process of becoming perfect, only "eternal and unchangeable" perfection (150). This seems inconsistent with his overall philosophical approach. If an infinite perfection, one that transcends itself and increases in perfection, is greater than one that is "eternal and unchangeable," then that must be God (as the greatest possible perfection). Many of Solovyov's uses of the term "absolute" imply "infinite absolute," and the very concept of Godmanhood surely suggests that God is enriched in the process of our perfection. This whole problem may explain Solovyov's introduction of two poles into the absolute.

"Vladimir Solovyov," p. 564.


A Solovyov Anthology, p. 24.

Ibid., pp. 26, 281 (italics in original).


"The pope names Solovyov first among the "eminent scholars" of theology and philosophy in the Russian context (chapter 6, section 74).

Quoted by Frank, A Solovyov Anthology, p. 27.