Iosif Volotskii
and Eastern Christianity
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Essays Across
Seventeen Centuries

Edited by David Goldfrank,
Valeria Nollan, and Jennifer Spock
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10 The Defense of Human Dignity in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought

Randall A. Poole

29 – Aleksandr Radishchev (1749-1802), unknown Artist.

30 – Ivan Kramskoi 1905 painting of Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900).

I

Nineteenth-century Russia presents a striking paradox: it was the most absolutist regime in Europe and yet its intellectual history, from Alexander Radishchev at the very beginning of the period to Vladimir Soloviev at its end, produced a powerful and multifaceted defense of human dignity. This paradox is not hard to explain: Russia's oppressive political and social reality gave the defense of human values greater urgency than farther west in Europe, where such values were more secure and better realized in practice. Moreover, the monolithic state order of the Russian autocracy necessitated that this defense take place mostly in the realm of ideas. The result is the very rich tradition of Russian humanist thought.
The origins of this paradox are closely related to those of the Russian intelligentsia. Under Catherine the Great (reigned 1762-1796) and Alexander I (reigned 1801-1825), Russia’s small educated public generally shared the autocracy’s ideology of enlightened absolutism. Educated, civic-minded Russians, usually members of the nobility, were encouraged to believe that they could work with the regime toward the goal of social progress. This shared Enlightenment framework started to break down in the second half of Alexander I’s reign and it ended altogether under the despotic rule of Nicholas I (reigned 1825-1855) in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Nicholas’s firm reassertion of autocracy, after the abortive Decembrist rebellion of 1825 that tried to prevent his accession to the throne, frustrated the ambitions of progressive Russians to influence public policy and to shape their country’s future. They were prevented from forming the type of civil society that might have been able, over the long run, to transform Russia into a liberal democratic polity. Some critics of the regime became so alienated that they formed an intelligentsia, from which a full-fledged revolutionary movement emerged by the 1860s. Other critics were more liberal and some, like the Slavophiles, were even conservative. Whether these liberal and conservative intellectuals also belonged to an intelligentsia in some broader sense is not an issue that I wish to pursue here. But Russian thinkers of all stripes forcefully advanced and defended their ideas against the autocracy and against each other. They wrote brilliant works of literature, social criticism, and philosophy, systematically defending the human values that were so flagrantly violated by both the autocracy and the revolutionary movement.

One current of Russian humanist thought was liberalism. Over the course of the century, it took on the broad meaning of a social philosophy of human dignity and of human rights. To be sure, not all Russian humanists were liberals; some, like the Slavophiles, Alexander Herzen, and Leo Tolstoy, rejected the defining liberal criterion of the rule of law (conceived as the necessary enforcement of human rights). Other Russian humanists were impatient with liberalism as “small deeds”—practical social, educational, and cultural work (kul’turnichество) among the Russian people—and as something to be developed in theory until the day came when it
could more fully be put into practice. Russian liberalism did achieve a very high level of theoretical development, rivaling anything in European social thought. Nineteenth-century Russia's two greatest philosophers, Boris Chicherin and Vladimir Soloviev, were also its greatest liberal theorists. This was not a coincidence: in Russia, philosophy did not have the luxury of being "purely philosophical," in the sense of being concerned primarily with method. Where human dignity was under constant assault from autocrats and revolutionaries, philosophy, too, or rather philosophy especially, had to take up its defense.

II

By its very nature, human dignity is a global concept. Histories of the idea can be traced in all of the world's major religious and philosophical traditions, from Confucianism and Hinduism to the Abrahamic religions.\textsuperscript{4} A seminal western formulation of the idea is Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's splendid oration, \textit{De hominis dignitate} (1486), often regarded as the manifesto of the Italian Renaissance. In it Pico recounts how God made man a "creature of indeterminate nature" and said to him:

The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. . . . We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.\textsuperscript{5}

Pico believed that the wondrous capacity for self-determination and perfectibility was the source of human dignity. Almost exactly
three centuries after his oration, an even more influential statement of human dignity appeared, Immanuel Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), a work that, despite its brevity, is “one of greatest and most influential achievements in the history of philosophy.” In it Kant locates human dignity in autonomy of the will or in self-determination, very much as Pico had done. Kant’s conception of human dignity had a powerful effect on Russian humanist thought, so it might be useful to review his argument at the outset.

The main idea of the *Groundwork* is the autonomy of the will, or self-determination by the moral law. Kant says that autonomy is the “supreme principle of morality”; without it there can be no true morality or self-determination, only externally determined or coerced behavior (G 89/4:440). His next link is dignity: in a key formulation he writes that autonomy is “the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (G 85/4:436). In other words, morality, “and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity” (G 84/4:435). Kant’s whole argument is analytic through-and-through: the distinctive human capacity is autonomy or self-determination, i.e., free fulfillment of the moral law given by pure reason. This capacity (morality) is the ground of dignity and of personhood itself, which amount to the same thing. Kant also uses the term “practical reason” to designate the capacity of reason to determine the will by its own ideals, the moral law first of all. So, in the end, autonomy, self-determination, practical reason, morality, dignity, and personhood turn out to be closely related concepts which explicate each other. The striking analytic character of Kant’s practical philosophy is the basis of its truth, if you accept the metaphysical premises of autonomy (pure reason and free will). By the end of the nineteenth century, Russia’s idealist philosophers did accept them. They embraced Kant’s conception of autonomy, dignity, and personhood as their own.

Like Pico, Kant related human dignity to perfectibility, another idea that is analytically derived from the core concept of autonomy. Kantian perfectibility is simply infinite self-determination. He stressed that the moral law must always remain an ideal, for self-determination is possible only by an ideal. Once an ideal is positively or externally given, it is no longer an ideal but a fact.
With that, self-determination closes down and becomes external determination; autonomy becomes heteronomy. This has the interesting implication that dignity and personhood itself seem to depend on what might be called "ideal self-determination." Kant defines perfect virtue or holiness as the complete conformity of the will with the moral law, but he holds that this is a state that human beings can never achieve, not even in the afterlife. We are capable only of "endless progress" or of infinite perfectibility toward holiness. Such infinite progress is the premise of Kant’s postulate of immortality: the soul itself must be "endless" in order to pursue "endless progress" (PrR 238/5:122). The moral law always remains as an ideal, it always drives progress toward it, and therefore it always enables the "ideal self-determination" that is a condition of human dignity and personhood.

III

The relevance of the Piconian-Kantian conception of human dignity to nineteenth-century Russian thought is obvious from the very beginning of the period. Alexander Radishchev (1749-1802) was one of the most important thinkers of the Russian Enlightenment. He is best known for his Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow, published in 1790. It is a searing attack on serfdom and autocracy as gross violations of the rule of law, which principle Radishchev eloquently defended as the basis of his liberal social philosophy. Catherine the Great had him condemned to death for his views but commuted the sentence to ten years of Siberian exile. While in exile he wrote an essay entitled On Man, His Mortality and Immortality. Apparently published posthumously in 1809, the treatise was the first major theoretical work of Russian philosophy. In its first pages Radishchev echoes Pico. He states that man’s distinguishing quality is that "he can perfect himself, and he can also become depraved. The limit in either direction is still unknown. But what animal can accomplish so much, for good or for evil, as man?" Radishchev adduces various arguments on behalf of the soul’s mortality and immortality, concluding in favor of immortality. One of his arguments is very similar to Kant’s, though he may have drawn it from other Enlightenment sources. In Radishchev’s account, the
soul strives toward endless self-perfection. This process is infinite, it continues after death, and it entails immortality. Perfectibility through inner self-determination, together with the possible metaphysical implications of this distinctively human capacity, would prove to be an enduring theme in Russian philosophical thought.

As early as the 1780s, Russians recognized Kant as an outstanding philosopher. In 1794 there was a proposal to elect him to the Russian Academy of Sciences. In the first decade of the nineteenth century he was the subject of academic lectures and of articles. The *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* was translated in 1803 and a manuscript translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was in circulation by 1820. By then, however, Kant’s influence, though it would return in full force later in the century, was already beginning to be displaced by that of his idealist successors as the Enlightenment waned in Russia. Schelling was the first to capture the Russian imagination, in the 1820s, followed by Hegel in the 1830s. The Russian reception of Schelling and German romanticism, on the one hand, and of Hegelianism, on the other, formed the two philosophical poles of the famous Slavophile-Westernizer controversy, which took shape in the 1840s. Slavophilism was the most important romantic movement in Russia. It maintained that the country should return to its allegedly native principles of Christian love, faith, and community, which were said to be embodied in the Russian Orthodox church and in the peasant commune. The Westernizers advanced their ideas within the philosophical framework of Hegelianism, in direct opposition to Slavophile conservative romanticism. They were united by a general belief that Russia should develop along western, European lines.

I would argue that the Slavophiles and Westernizers advanced their respective social philosophies, philosophies of history, and conceptions of national identity out of a more fundamental concern, shared by both sides, over how best to promote human dignity and personhood. The Slavophiles wanted to protect the integrity, spiritual unity, and inner wholeness of the human person against what they considered to be the destructive, atomizing forces of western rationalism and individualism. The Westernizers wanted
to defend precisely what the Slavophiles opposed, the rational autonomy of the person (in the more general and not necessarily Kantian sense of autonomy). Their ideal was the autonomous individual who realizes him or herself through conscious action in history. But in their defense of human dignity, the two sides were perhaps not as far apart as has been assumed.

IV

To see this, let us take a closer look, first, at the Slavophile conception. The leading Slavophile philosopher was Ivan Kireevskii (1806-1856). Recently he has been called the "most powerful philosophical mind of his generation." He laid out the Slavophile theory of integral personhood ("iselnaja lichnost") most comprehensively in his late essay "On the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy" (1856), and also in the related and essential "Fragments" published a year later by Aleksei Khomiakov (1804-1860). The main theme of the 1856 essay is the compatibility of faith and reason. Kireevskii argues that faith should be the ground of reason, or more precisely that it should ground reason in divine being. This is his landmark concept of "believing reason," which integrates and achieves the

31 – Ivan Kireevskii (1806-1856).
wholeness of mind, spirit and soul necessary to appreciate the full truth of reality. The faith that grounds reason in divine being, the faith that makes it an integral, "believing reason," can only come from within. This is the condition of dignity, a point he emphasizes. True faith cannot come from external authority, the Catholic Church being his prime counterexample. Significantly he remarks that the Reformation "restored to human beings their dignity and also won for them the right to be reasoning beings" (240). But Protestantism and the rationalist philosophy that followed it, culminating in Hegelianism, erred in seeking to ground reason in itself, rather than in divine being as revealed through inner faith. The true path was indicated by the Greek church fathers, whose works Kireevskii had studied and translated during his visits to the Optina Monastery near his country estate.15

Greek patristic theology, interestingly enough, was one of the sources of the Renaissance idea of human dignity.16 Kireevskii highlights this important historical connection: "The eyes of many Europeans were opened by the writings of the Holy Fathers that were brought from Greece after its fall" (253). In his view this was a missed opportunity for the West to return to the universal church. Instead there followed further division with the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Protestantism achieved individual freedom, but at the cost of unity; Catholicism continued along its historical path of unity without individual freedom. By contrast, the Orthodox church, as Kireevskii imagined it, respects freedom of conscience while preserving unity in its understanding of faith as the inner revelation of one divine truth. Faith, or inner consciousness of the divine, does not constrain "the free development of the natural laws of reason" (260). Reason grounded in faith and freely developing from it is, as we have seen, Kireevskii's concept of believing reason. Rooted in the ancient teachings of the Greek church fathers, it forms the main "new principle" in philosophy suggested in the title of his essay. This new principle or something like it was also recognized by Schelling, whom Kireevskii calls "one of those beings who are born not once in centuries but once in millennia" (271).17

Believing reason is the basis of Kireevskii's theory of the integral human person. In one of his most famous passages (from one of the "fragments"), he writes that faith:
embraces the entire wholeness of the human being.... Therefore, believing thought is best characterized by its attempt to gather all the separate parts of the soul into one force, to search out that inner heart of being where reason and will, feeling and conscience, the beautiful and the true, the wonderful and the desired, the just and the merciful, and all the capacity of mind converge into one living unity, and in this way the essential human personality is restored in its primordial indivisibility [285].

In another fragment, he affirms personhood and human dignity, declaring that “only a reasoning and free personality is what is essential in the world. It alone has a distinctive significance. Everything else has only a relative significance” (284). Rationalism is not adequate to the essential, because it operates at the level of the relative and abstract; it separates the subject and object of knowledge from each other and so prevents “integral knowledge.” Believing reason, by contrast, is capable of bringing them together in an immediate, concrete intuition. It is true to reality in its ontological or noumenal essence, whereas rationalism grasps only phenomena. It is a kind of inner revelation or immediate apprehension that penetrates to the heart of reality, ultimately to God, thus grounding the human person in divine being.18 These ideas would have great influence on Russian religious philosophy later in the nineteenth century.19

V

The defense of human dignity was also a major theme among the Westernizers, though they took a different—Hegelian—philosophical approach to it. Hegelianism had a profound impact on Russian thought. Initially, in the second half of the 1830s, it was largely interpreted as a philosophy of “reconciliation with reality,” a type of intellectual compensation for the near absence of public life in Russia under Nicholas I. Riasanovsky called it a “strange chapter” in Russian intellectual history, one based on a reading of Hegel’s famous thesis, “What is real is rational, what is rational is real.”20 Reality was rational because it was a necessary aspect of the
self-realization of the absolute; therefore the only logical course was to be reconciled with it, no matter how oppressive it seemed. This conservative historicist approach soon gave way, however, to a Left-Hegelian “philosophy of action,” which resulted in the affirmation of individual freedom, responsibility, and dignity. The emphasis shifted from the self-realization of the absolute in history, which implied the individual’s reconciliation before historical necessity, to the self-realization of the individual through active participation in history. By this stage (the early 1840s) Hegelianism self-consciously formed the philosophical framework of the Westernizers in their struggle against Slavophile conservative romanticism.²¹

The most visible figure among the Westernizers, indeed one of the founding members of the Russian intelligentsia, was the famous literary critic Vissarion Belinskii (1811-1848). He experienced a period of “reconciliation with reality,” replete with accolades to the “most rational necessity” of the Russian tsar,²² but soon rejected it for active participation in history. He took up the defense of the free, autonomous individual, which he now insisted ought not to be reduced to being a mere instrument of absolute spirit realizing itself in history. In March 1841 he wrote, “The fate of the subject, the individual, the person is of more importance to me than the fate of the whole world.”²³ In these words Belinskii vindicates, in Walicki’s formulation, “the particular (the real, living individual) against the tyranny of the universal (the Absolute, Reason, and the Spirit).” His affirmation of the autonomous individual against totalizing philosophical systems (such as Hegelian absolute idealism) came at the cost, however, of a certain tendency toward materialism, Ludwig Feuerbach’s ideas in particular.²⁴

Alexander Herzen (1812-1870), the founder of “Russian socialism” and among the most famous Russian thinkers, never experienced a period of “reconciliation with reality,” but he did undertake a serious study of Hegel’s philosophy.²⁵ The result was two long cycles of essays, Dilettantism in Science (1843) and Letters on the Study of Nature (1845-1846), the best products of Russian Left Hegelianism. In “Buddhism in Science,” the most important essay from the first cycle, Herzen argues that the person or self comes into its own through concrete, active participation in history, not “Buddhist” withdrawal in abstract, universalizing thought (Hegel’s
"panlogism"). The self must master and appropriate the universal (or universal ideals), in the process personalizing the universal and universalizing itself (as Herzen’s thought might be formulated). It must realize the universal in the particular, bringing it down to earth and raising the earth up to it. This process is history, and in it the self realizes its own autonomy, rationality, and dignity. That is the basic meaning of Herzen’s dictum, “Action is the personality itself”—free, rational, and conscious action in history. It is a positive reconciliation, an Aristotelian “live unity of theory and practice.”

In some of his most famous words, Herzen wrote: “It is only in rational, morally free, and passionately energetic action that man arrives at the actuality of his personality and immortalizes himself in the phenomenal world. In such action man is eternal in the transient, infinite in the finite.”

In Letters on the Study of Nature, Herzen remains occupied with the theme of how the autonomous person realizes itself through reconciling the particular and universal, but he turns more to the epistemological foundations of his theory. Thus, he begins with basic methodological problems involved in the study of nature, outlining two ways of looking at the world. First are empirical methodologies and natural sciences, which concern themselves with particulars and with factual data. Second are speculative philosophical approaches such as idealism, which deal with universals. But neither empiricism nor idealism is sufficient on its own, and each tends to lead naturally to the other. True knowledge of the world requires a synthesis of both approaches. This synthesis,” Walicki writes, “would benefit not only science but also—even chiefly—the development of the human personality.”

This is so because empiricism, by itself, fragments the human personality and threatens it with disintegration, while idealism (metaphysics) crushes it under the weight of the universal. A sounder, more stable, and more holistic approach to the person rests on a synthesis of empiricist and idealist principles, or on a type of “integral knowledge” of the world (to borrow the Slavophile term, though in their epistemologies and theories of the person Herzen and Kireevskii are quite different thinkers).

In 1847 Herzen left Russia. During the first several years of his lifelong emigration, he developed an alternative vision of the
future of Russia. His conception, known as "Russian socialism," combined elements from Petr Chaadaev, the Slavophiles, and the Westernizers: the "privilege of backwardness" in a country without the burdens of the past and thus freer to create its own future, the communalism of the Russian people, and the personality principle of the westernized elites. Herzen based his hopes for Russian socialism on a voluntaristic philosophy of history directed against teleological systems of historical necessity. He laid out his new philosophy of history, which repudiated important tenets of his earlier Hegelianism, in *From the Other Shore* (1850). His defense of individual liberty and critique of ideologies that threaten such liberty are well known, in part because they were championed by Sir Isaiah Berlin. According to Herzen, history is a "whirlwind of chance," an open field of contingency and possibility within which human beings are free to realize their moral uniqueness and autonomy. He insisted that the individual ought never to be sacrificed to intellectual abstractions such as historical progress or the happiness of future generations. The defense of pluralism, the intrinsic value and dignity of the individual, and open-ended development were all important themes, but he neglected the vital importance of law in the defense of human dignity, liberty, and rights.

VI

The Westernizers formed a broad camp spanning a range of political views from radical to liberal. The anarchist Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) was a radical if ever there were one; he can hardly be ranked among the great defenders of human dignity. Belinskii and Herzen occupied an intermediate position. The main liberal Westernizers were Timofei Granovskii (1813-1855), Konstantin Kavelin (1818-1885), and Boris Chicherin (1828-1904). All three were Moscow University historians who, following Hegel, believed that the goal of the historical process, in Russia as in Europe, was the emancipation of the individual through the rationalization of social relations and law. Kavelin and Chicherin defended the rise of the centralized Muscovite state in this process. They founded the "state school" of Russian historiography, which held that the state
was the main agent of progress in Russian history.

Kavelin’s 1847 essay, “A Survey of Juridical Life in Old Russia,” is one of the defining statements of Russian Westernism. It is also an eloquent defense of human dignity and of personhood as the guiding principles of progressive historical development. Kavelin attributed these principles to the advent of Christianity, which revealed to human beings an inner spiritual world, infinitely more precious than the external, material world. Christianity challenged humanity to express and develop its spiritual potential, and this “had to change completely the nature of history.” With the Christian challenge to spiritual self-realization, “human personhood had to acquire a great, holy significance that previously it did not have.” Thus arose, Kavelin writes, the idea of human dignity, the idea of the infinite and absolute value of the human person. This “completely new view of man” freed him from slavery to nature and to external circumstances: “man went from being determined to being determining,” in his apt formulation. Kavelin’s conclusion to this seminal passage is that the principles of “absolute human and personal dignity” (beskonechnoe, bezuslovnoe dostoinstvo cheloveka i chelovecheskoi lichnosti) and of humanity’s “fullest possible moral and intellectual development” have, since their introduction by Christianity, become the “slogans of all modern history.” In fact, he writes, “there is one goal for all peoples of the modern Christian world: unconditional recognition of human and personal dignity [dostoinstvo cheloveka, litse] and man’s all-round development. But all go toward this goal by various, infinitely diverse paths, like nature itself and the historical conditions of peoples.”

Chicherin studied with Kavelin and followed his teacher in making human dignity the foundation of his mature social and legal philosophy, though that would come mainly later, in the last two decades of the century. Thus Chicherin, Russia’s greatest Hegelian philosopher, was the living link between the 1840s and the neo-idealist revival at the end of the century.

VII

Meanwhile, a new period in Russian intellectual history began with Alexander II’s succession to the throne in 1855. The intelligentsia turned toward radicalism as the hopes of the Great Reforms turned
to frustration and disappointment. Thinkers such as Nikolai Chernyshevskii (1828-1889), Nikolai Dobroliubov (1836-1861), and Dmitrii Pisarev (1840-1868) advanced various combinations of materialism, scientism, utilitarianism, and “rational egoism.” Their outlook, frequently referred to as “nihilism,” was notoriously embodied by Bazarov, the hero of Ivan Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Children. Though the worldview of the radical intelligentsia was charged with humanist pathos, its philosophical flaws prevented it from dealing successfully with the problem of human dignity. Its materialism and reductive positivism denied both free will and the ideals by which the will can alone be self-determining. If one follows the Kantian concept of personhood as consisting in ideal self-determination, then the radicals undermined personhood at its very foundations. As Pisarev put it, “I see in life only a process, and I eliminate purpose and ideal.”

Positivism formed the general climate of progressive public opinion in Russia down to the twentieth century. In its most reductive forms, it took a naturalistic view of the world, asserting that the only reality, or at least the only one that we can know, is the empirical world of positively-given sense data. Yet the dominance of positivism was never complete. Pisarev, in the words quoted above, was responding to Petr Lavrov (1823-1900), who was an important theorist of Russian populism, the main revolutionary movement of the 1870s. In his influential essay cycle Historical Letters (1868-1869), Lavrov argued that progress was not a necessary historical law unfolding of its own accord but rather a moral task to be accomplished by “critically thinking individuals” inspired by ideals such as justice and human dignity.

By the 1880s, a new wave of idealism broke upon the Russian philosophical scene and increasingly dominated it until the Bolshevik Revolution. It mounted a powerful revolt against positivism. The first salvos were major ones: Boris Chicherin’s Science and Religion (1879) and Vladimir Soloviev’s Critique of Abstract Principles (1880). The late-century idealist revival is generally referred to as Russian neo-idealism to distinguish it from the idealism of the second quarter of the century, which, as we have seen, owed more to Kant’s successors than to Kant himself. Russian neo-idealism raised the defense of human dignity to new levels. A
prominent role in these developments was played by the Moscow Psychological Society, founded in 1885. Its name is somewhat misleading: though it did conduct and publish psychological research, its greater significance in Russian intellectual history is as the first and main center of the growth of Russian philosophy in this period. A key factor in the society’s success was its journal *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology* (1889-1918), Russia’s first regular, specialized journal in philosophy. In 1902 the society published *Problems of Idealism*, a large collective work that advanced a powerful critique of positivism and an innovative idealist defense of the main principles of liberalism. By then the society had become the theory center of Russian liberalism. Chicherin and Soloviev, as Russia’s greatest idealist philosophers and liberal theorists, were its most distinguished members. They and their followers in the society, for all the differences among them, shared the same essential conception of liberalism: its first principle was human dignity—the ground, in turn, of human rights, whose enforcement defined the ultimate purpose and justification of the rule of law.

VIII

Chicherin is best known as Russia’s greatest Hegelian philosopher. He always considered himself a Hegelian, remarking in 1900 that he regarded Hegel as “the last word of idealist philosophy.” But beginning in the 1870s he adopted a liberal, Kantian interpretation of Hegel, so much so that Evgenii Trubetskoii, who knew him well, thought that his defense of the intrinsic value of personhood marked the “sharpest difference between Hegel’s panlogism and Chicherin’s individualistic worldview.” Chicherin’s restoration of the Kantian principle of human dignity makes him the father of Russian neo-idealism. The key to his mature philosophy is his conception of human nature: he held that human beings are persons because they are endowed with reason and will, neither of which can be wholly explained by the positive or empirical sciences. This alone makes man a “metaphysical being,” in his phrase. The metaphysical nature of personhood (reason and will) is the ground of human dignity, an argument Chicherin pursues at length and that is central to his conception of idealism.
32 – 1905, portrait by Leonid Pasternak of the veteran liberal scholar and zemstvo leader Boris Chicherin (1828-1904)

He defines reason as consciousness of the absolute, or of the absolute principle. It is “consciousness of pure law,” of necessity and universality, in both knowledge (theoretical reason) and action (practical reason). The practical form of consciousness of the absolute is the moral law, “which was revealed in all its profundity by the father of modern metaphysics, Kant.” Chicherin was strongly influenced by the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.* The Russian philosopher adopted its main principle as his own: the “supreme dignity” of the human person is a matter of self-determination according to the moral law, as he put it in his masterpiece, *Philosophy of Right,* published in 1900. Like Kant, he considered practical reason to be the ground of personhood: “Freedom of the will constitutes … the basic definition of man as a rational being. Precisely because of this is he recognized as a person [*liito*] and are rights ascribed to him.” In a significant passage, he summarizes the nature and properties of personhood, emphasizing its intrinsic dignity:
The source of this supreme dignity of the human being and of all the demands flowing from it consists in the fact that he carries in himself consciousness of the Absolute, that is, this source lies precisely in the metaphysical nature of the subject, which raises it above the whole physical world and makes it a being having value in itself and demanding respect. In religious language this is expressed in the saying that we are created in the image and likeness of God.52

The “image and likeness” of God was a powerful metaphor for human dignity for other Russian neo-idealists as well, Vladimir Soloviev in particular, as we will see.

Chicherin called idealism the true philosophy of freedom and named Kant its founder. “There is not and cannot be any other foundation of inner freedom and morality,” he wrote.53 Note this categorical endorsement of Kant by someone who considered himself to be a Hegelian philosopher. Not all Russian idealists followed Chicherin in his Kantian conception of idealism, but many did, including Soloviev. They also considered idealism to be the true philosophy of progress, of the ever closer approximation of imperfect, finite reality to the perfect, infinite ideal, or of what Kant called “perfectibility.”54

Chicherin held that human dignity, as the first principle of liberalism, was the absolute value underlying society, law, and the state.55 He recognized that human beings are social by nature and that their higher potential as persons cannot be realized apart from society.56 The existence of society requires that the external liberty of people be mutually delimited as right (pravo) under coercive juridical law (zakon). In his definition, “right is a person’s external freedom, as determined by a universal law (obshchii zakon).” In another formulation, “Society consists of people, and for all of them it is extremely important that the areas left to the freedom of each be precisely delimited and protected by law, and this is the task of right.”57

Chicherin’s conception of right is essentially “negative liberty,” in the sense made famous by Isaiah Berlin. Very much unlike Berlin, however, Chicherin stresses that right is metaphysical in origin:
For external liberty becomes a right, that is, a demand, only because it is a manifestation of a person’s inner, absolute freedom. . . . This is also the basis of respect for a person, the source of any right. . . . Right is an ideal demand in the name of an ideal principle. Human beings are recognized as free only on account of their metaphysical essence; they have rights and demand respect only on account of their suprasensible nature.  

Freedom is the one source, both of right (external liberty) and morality (inner liberty as self-determination). The essential difference between them consists in the respective relationship of law to freedom in each sphere. The law that determines right, or the law of right (zakon prava), is juridical, purely external, and backed by coercive power. The moral law (nравственый закон) is directed only toward conscience and must be freely fulfilled. It can never be coerced by virtue of the nature of morality as inner freedom. Coerced fulfillment of the moral law, according to Chicherin, destroys the possibility of true morality and self-determination, and thus radically undermines the very foundations of human dignity and personhood.

Chicherin insisted that morality not be subject to juridical law or any coercion. But he did not think the reverse followed, that right and law are based only on coercion and that morality is to be excluded from their sphere. Rather, morality demands respect for right and the juridical order, since they are basic requirements of the existence of society, “without which the realization of moral principles would remain an empty phantom.” As he often affirms, “Morality demands respect for right, because it demands respect for human personhood and the law defending it.” When juridical law is observed not from fear of external punishment but out of consciousness of duty, then, he argues, it is not coerced but observed by free moral conviction.

This is an important qualification to his view that the threat of coercion is the distinctive criterion of the juridical law that upholds right. From it a series of questions arise, to wit: Which factor is more important, coercion or moral consciousness; does the balance shift with historical development; and, perhaps most important, doesn’t
the rule of law, in the higher sense of the limitation of arbitrary state power, ultimately rest on civil society, i.e., a citizenry with a well-developed legal consciousness? The tension in Chicherin's thought between coercion and morality in the observance of law proved to be a very creative one in the future development of Russian liberal theory. In general, the tendency was to de-emphasize coercion in favor of consciousness.\textsuperscript{44}

Chicherin's definition of right, and the distinction he draws between right and morality, are Kant's. In \textit{Property and State} the Russian philosopher wrote of his German predecessor, "the true foundations of morality and right were revealed by him." Kant understood freedom as the one source of both in its dual manifestation: "in the inner sphere, where it is subject to the moral law, and in the external sphere, where it is governed by the law of right [zakon prava]."\textsuperscript{45} In \textit{Philosophy of Right} Chicherin says that the distinction between morality and right was "fully explained" by Kant.\textsuperscript{46} In his essay on Kant in \textit{History of Political Theory} he cites Kant's famous definitions in \textit{The Metaphysics of Morals} that right is the coexistence of everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law and that it authorizes the use of coercion (MM 387-388/6:230-231).\textsuperscript{47}

Chicherin's indications that morality demands respect for right and the juridical order took him directly to the problem of natural law and justice, terms that signified virtually the same concept for him.\textsuperscript{48} He prefers "justice," which he defines in terms of core (metaphysical) human equality.\textsuperscript{49} "True justice," he writes, "consists in the recognition for all of equal human dignity and freedom."\textsuperscript{50} The minimal requirement is equality before the law or equality of rights. In the chapter of \textit{Philosophy of Right} devoted to the topic of personal rights, Chicherin contrasts the French Revolution's declaration of a whole series of natural and inalienable rights to Kant's view that there is only one innate right, freedom, from which all the others derive.\textsuperscript{51} He accepts Kant's position, but asks in what sense can freedom be considered an innate right. Not in the sense, he says, of some "state of nature" apart from any civil order. "Authentic human freedom is not the freedom on an animal," he declares, "but civil freedom, subordinated to universal law. Only on account of this subordination does freedom become a right."\textsuperscript{52}
Chicherin’s social conception of human rights follows directly from his (and Kant’s) definition of right as external liberty under law. He preferred to speak not of natural rights but of праовоспособность— the natural human capacity or potential to bear rights,73 a potential that can be realized only in society, which is its whole justification. The realization of this potential is the (long and violent) historical process by which “natural man” is transformed into a citizen, “disciplined and respecting the right of others.”74

The Kantian principles of liberalism form what Chicherin calls “individualism,” or respect for the absolute value and dignity of the human person. Individualism is the “source and foundation” of any sound social theory but does not in itself complete such a theory. To complete it, Chicherin turned to Hegel, whose “great contribution” was to have outlined, in his “objective ethics,” a rational social order in which people could find their higher unity and pursue the true realization of their freedom and dignity.75 Space prevents me from pursuing the details here, but from the beginning of his account in Philosophy of Right, Chicherin interprets Hegel in a Kantian, liberal direction to safeguard the sanctity of the human person, maintaining that the higher social order of Hegel’s objective ethics “achieves its true significance only when it is based on the rights and claims of the individual person.”76 He emphasized in particular the autonomy of civil society relative to the state: “For human personhood, for its freedom and rights, this recognition of the autonomy of civil society could not be more important.”77 He thought that the rule of law ultimately rested on a strong civil society suffused with a consciousness of human dignity, civil rights, and justice.

IX

Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900), Russia’s greatest religious philosopher, is usually portrayed as a rather different type of thinker than Chicherin, both in substance and style. Walicki presents them as representatives of the “old” and “new” Russian liberalism.78 There is much truth in this contrast. But the similarities between the two philosophers are at least as significant as the differences.

Soloviev embedded his defense of human dignity within his
philosophy of Godmanhood (bogochelovechestvo, also translated theanthropy, divine humanity, or the humanity of God). In his Lectures on Godmanhood (delivered in 1878), his doctoral thesis Critique of Abstract Principles (defended and published in 1880), and in other works, he stipulates that human beings combine in themselves three principles: the absolute or divine principle, the material principle, and (between them) the distinctively human principle, which is rational autonomy or the capacity for self-determination.79 The middle, human principle of autonomy is derived entirely from Kant.80 Godmanhood combines the divine and human principles. It is the free human realization of the divine idea in ourselves and in the world. It is the realization of humanity’s divine potential: deification or, to use the patristic term, theosis. It is, in short, the human project of building the kingdom of God. Soloviev always maintained that Godmanhood cannot be achieved without human autonomy: “The divine content must be appropriated by a human being from within himself, consciously and freely,” through the fullest development of human rationality.81

The Russian philosopher Semen Frank wrote that the concept of Godmanhood extends the Chalcedonian dogma of Christ the God-man’s two natures to all of existence.82 It extends it, at any rate, to all human persons. I would argue that the concept is a distinctively Kantian interpretation of Chalcedon that emphasizes the autonomy of the human principle relative to the divine. In every human person, the divine element (the “image of God” in us) must be freely recognized and embraced by the human element (that is, by reason and will). Our task is to bring our nature into ever closer “likeness” or conformity with God. Christ achieved this perfect conformity, and he did so through an act of the rational human will.83 As Oliver Smith puts it, “The humanity of Christ is ‘spiritualized’ or divinized not despite his humanity but because of it.”84 We are to follow Jesus’ example and teaching: “Be perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect” (Matthew 5:48, one of Soloviev’s favorite verses). This is the true, divine-human path to the kingdom of God: divine in that God is the ideal of perfection, human in that the task of perfectibility is ours. Soloviev followed Kant in thinking that the kingdom of God could come only through the kingdom of ends, Kant’s famous ideal of a moral order whose members respect each other as persons or ends-in-themselves.85
The autonomy and perfectibility by which our intrinsic potential divinity alone can be realized form the ground of human dignity. The divine principle in itself is not the source of human dignity; it must be coupled with the distinctively human principle of self-determination. For this connection Soloviev was deeply indebted to Kant, whose conception of autonomy and dignity he called the “essence of morality.” The Russian philosopher insisted that the realization of our divine potential be internally rather than externally determined (autonomously rather than heteronomously, in Kant’s terms). Otherwise human dignity would be deprived of its basis. Salvation apart from self-determination would violate human dignity or at any rate be accomplished past it.

Soloviev’s most powerful and systematic defense of human dignity is Justification of the Good (1897), widely regarded as the most important Russian work of moral philosophy. The very concept of the “justification of the good” is human perfectibility or progress toward Godmanhood. It is Soloviev’s version of Kant’s theology of moral perfectibility—Kant’s notion, as we have seen, of “endless progress” toward holiness and of the postulates therefrom of immortality and of the existence of God. Soloviev preferred to speak of the divine principle or divine image in us rather than merely of Kant’s moral law, but the “image” of God functions as the ideal just like Kant’s moral law, while the human “likeness” to God describes our capacity for self-determination and infinite perfectibility according to the image or ideal. In one passage he calls the image of God the power of representation (of absolute perfection) and the likeness of God the power of striving (to achieve it). This “double infinity” belongs to everyone. “It is in this that the absolute significance, dignity, and worth of human personhood consist, and this is the basis of its inalienable rights.” In another passage, perhaps the most capacious in Justification of the Good, he wrote: “The absolute value of man is based, as we know, upon the possibility inherent in his reason and his will of infinitely approaching perfection or, according to the patristic expression, the possibility of becoming divine (theosis).”

Soloviev consistently held that human perfectibility (again, progress toward Godmanhood) is realized in society and develops in history. His social philosophy was first presented
The philosophical legacies of Chicherin and Soloviev inspired and informed Problems of Idealism, published by the Moscow Psychological Society in 1902. The volume's impressive exposition of the philosophical foundations of liberalism strategically coincided—as its organizers intended—with the first stages of the Russian Liberation Movement that would culminate in the Revolution of 1905. The project was planned by Peter Struve, who had just completed his evolution from Marxism to idealism, and by Pavel Novgorodtsev, a legal philosopher at Moscow University. The defense of human rights was integral to their conception of liberalism, as it was to Chicherin's and Soloviev's. This was so, I would suggest, because their conceptions were self-consciously idealist, specifically Kantian, and firmly grounded in the principle of human dignity. The idealism of Russian liberalism distinguishes it from other contemporary European liberalisms, which were generally positivistic in their philosophical outlook. If there was a relative paucity of appeals to human rights in nineteenth-century European liberalism as a whole, as some historians today claim, then this philosophical difference might help to explain it.

Earlier in this chapter I noted that in the circumstances of autocratic Russia, liberalism was something to be developed mainly in theory until the day when it could be put more fully into practice. That day seemed to have arrived in 1905, when civil society, inspired to take up the defense of human dignity and human rights, was just strong enough to force Nicholas II to concede a constitution. But Nicholas continued to think of himself as an autocrat and to do everything possible to impede Russia's further liberal development. Under the enormous strains of the Great War, the old regime collapsed in February 1917. In October of that year, the Bolsheviks, heirs of the radical intelligentsia and of the old revolutionary movement, took power and proceeded to impose their own autocracy on Russia. In 1922 Lenin exiled almost hundred leading members of the country's humanistic intelligentsia. He understood well enough that its defense of human dignity was inimical to the Bolshevik vision of Russia's future. Like the nihilists before him, he rejected the very
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notion of the ideal. The most obvious example of this goes to the heart of Leninism: in 1902 he pronounced the workers incapable of developing their own true consciousness, which, as a result, would have to be externally imposed on them. For Lenin everything was a matter of external determination by the party, not of individual self-determination. Thus he undermined human dignity at its very foundations. For this reason Nikolai Berdiaev wrote, "Lenin did not believe in man."

Abbreviations


Notes

1 This chapter is based on a public lecture delivered at Rhodes College (February 2014), St. Mary’s University of Minnesota (April 2013), the College of St. Scholastica (January 2013), and the University of Toronto (February 2012). The development of a distinctive Russian tradition of philosophical humanism focused on the defense of human dignity is the main theme of A History of Russian Philosophy, 1830–1930: Faith, Reason, and the Defense of Human Dignity, edited by G. M. Hamburg and Randall A. Poole (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

2 On the origins and nature of the Russian intelligentsia, see Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers, edited by Henry Hardy and Alleen Kelly, rev. 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 2008); G. M. Hamburg “Russian


6 Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12.

7 References to Kant are to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, in this case to the volume Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, introduction by Allen Wood (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This volume contains, among Kant’s works that I have used here, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals (G), Critique of Practical Reason (PrR), and The Metaphysics of Morals (MM). The first page reference is to the Cambridge edition, the second to the standard German edition of Kant's works, *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (as indicated in the margins of the Cambridge edition). Kant writes that "neither fear nor inclination but simply respect for the [moral] law is that incentive which can give actions a moral worth" (G 88/4:440).

8 The treatise is translated in part by Frank Y. Gladney and George L. Kline in RP 1: 77–100, here 78.


16 Werner Jaeger emphasizes the Greek influence: "From the Renaissance the line leads straight back to the Christian humanism of the [Greek]
fathers of the fourth century A.D. and to their idea of man's dignity.

... With the Greeks who emigrated after the fall of Constantine
(1453) there came to Italy the whole literary tradition of the Byzantine
East, and the works of the Greek fathers were its choicest part." See
Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1961), 100-101. See also Paul Oskar Kristeller,
Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, edited by Michael Mooney
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); and Charles Trinkaus, In Our
Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought,
2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970/Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).

17 Walicki has emphasized Kireevsky's debt to European romanticism,
especially the later Schelling's philosophy of revelation (Philosophie
der Offenbarung) — in opposition to Hegel, in whom both Schelling and
the Slavophiles saw the culmination of European rationalism. Walicki,
Slavophile Controversy, 121-178.

18 Walicki, Slavophile Controversy, 155-156. Another fragment contains the
following words: "Justice, morality, the spirit of the people, human
dignity, and the sanctity of lawfulness can all be felt only along with
an awareness of the eternal religious relations of humanity" (291). The
"sanctity of lawfulness" is an interesting "non-Slavophile" expression
in this context.

19 Vladimir Soloviev, for example, was much indebted to them, as
even the titles of some of his earlier philosophical works betray:
The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge (1877) and Critique
of Abstract Principles (1880). The first has recently been translated:
Vladimir Solovyov, The Philosophical Principles of Integral Knowledge,
translated by Valeria Z. Nollan (Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge,

20 Riasanovsky, Parting of Ways, 211-212.

21 Walicki, History of Russian Thought, ch. 7, "The Russian Hegelians—
From 'Reconciliation with Reality' to 'Philosophy of Action'."

22 The quoted phrase is from Belinskii's 1839 review of Zhukovskii's
poem "The Anniversary of Borodino." The review is quoted at length
in Riasanovsky, Parting of Ways, 213-215.

23 Vissarion Belinskii, "Letters to V. P. Botkin," translated by Philip
Rahv, in RP 1: 304. His 1847 letter to Nikolai Gogol was also much
celebrated. The letter was in response to Gogol's Selected Passages from
Correspondence with Friends, in which the Russian novelist, theretofore
regarded as a keen critic of Russian state and society, humbly and
piously accepted the Orthodox Church and the whole tsarist system,
including serfdom. Belinskii penned a scathing denunciation that
could also be read as directed against the Slavophiles. He chided Gogol for failing "to observe that Russia sees her salvation not in mysticism or asceticism or pietism, but in the advances of civilization, enlightenment, and humanity. She needs not sermons . . . or prayers . . . but the awakening in the people of a sense of their human dignity, lost in the mud and filth for so many centuries; she needs rights and laws which conform not to the teachings of the Church but to common sense and justice." Vissarion Belinskii, "Letter to Gogol," translated by James P. Scanlan, in RP 1: 313.

24 Walicki, History of Russian Thought, 126.


28 Walicki, History of Russian Thought, 131-134, quotation at 132.


40 Cited in note 33 above.
41 For an authoritative account of Chicherin and Soloviev as liberal philosophers, see Andrzey Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), chs. 2 and 3.
43 Boris Chicherin, Filosofia prava (Moscow, 1900), 24. The book was serialized in Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, 1898-1899.
45 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 26-28, 54.
46 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 7.
47 Chicherin, Nauka i religiia, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1901), 113.
48 Chicherin, Liberty, Equality, and the Market, 359; the quotation is from the key first chapter (cited below as “Liberty”) of his Sobstvennost’ i gosudarstvo, 2 vols. (Moscow: 1882-1883).
49 Chicherin’s essay on Kant in his Istoriiia politicheskikh uchenii, 5 vols. (Moscow: 1869-1902), vol. 3: 324-374 (cited below as “Kant”), contains
a good exposition of the *Groundwork* with citations to the German text (330-336). Hamburg, "Boris Chicherin and Human Dignity in History," *HRP*, 124, refers to Chicherin's "remarkably sympathetic" account here of the *Groundwork* (and of the *Critique of Practical Reason*). In a chapter of *Philosophy of Right* entitled "The Moral Law and Freedom," Chicherin presents the main conclusions of the *Groundwork* as his own (*Filosofija prava*, 170-177).

50 Chicherin, *Filosofija prava*, 176. He also writes, "The whole moral dignity of man is based on the free fulfillment of the [moral] law" (31).

51 Chicherin, *Filosofija prava*, 53.

52 Chicherin, *Filosofija prava*, 55.


54 In one of Chicherin's formulations, "Humanity's whole development proceeds from ideal aspirations. Reason, in the name of as of yet unrealized goals, reworks what is [sushchestvennoe]. As soon as we renounce idealism, we will also have to renounce progress, and with it freedom, which serves as its instrument." Chicherin, *Nauka i religija*, 129 (note).


57 Chicherin, *Filosofija prava*, 84, 86; also see "Liberty," 363-364.


60 Chicherin, *Filosofija prava*, 90.

61 Chicherin, *Filosofija prava*, 188.


63 According to E. N. Trubetskoi, Chicherin, "like the majority of contemporary jurists, sees in coercion the essential characteristic of law [pravo]." He thinks this is mistaken. See Trubetskoi, "Uchenie B. N. Chicherina," 362.

64 Leon Petrovsky's psychological theory of law, though it was broadly positivist rather than idealist, was also an important factor in this development. See Walicki, *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*, chapter 4.

65 Chicherin, *Sobstvennost' i gosudarstvo*, vol. 1: 41.

66 Chicherin, *Filosofija prava*, 175.


68 He uses the term "natural law" to distinguish between positive or statutory law and the higher norms to which it should be subject. Natural law is not enacted, "and therefore is not coercive law, but a system of universal juridical norms issuing from human reason that ought to serve as a measure and guide for positive legislation." Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 94.


70 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 99.

71 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 105; also see "Kant," 349. Chicherin's derivation of equality and basic personal rights from innate freedom closely follows Kant's formulation in The Metaphysics of Morals (MM 393-394/6:237-238).

72 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 106.

73 For examples, see "Hegel" and "Equality" in Liberty, Equality, and the Market, 299, 386. See also Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 138.

74 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 106.

75 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 228.

76 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 228. The nature of Chicherin's Hegelianism changed over the course of his career, from "conservative liberalism" to "classical liberalism," with 1866 being a watershed. That year saw both the publication of Chicherin's O narodnom predstavitel'stvе (On Popular Representation) and the shift in Russia's political climate toward the autocratic retrenchment that characterized the remaining decades of the old regime and that gave rise in turn to the revolutionary movement. In this climate, Hamburg argues, "Chicherin sought ways to secure the sphere of individual liberty against infringements by both state and society as a whole." Hamburg, Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism, 342. The results were clear by 1882, when Chicherin published Property and State, with its classic liberal emphasis on individual rights and civil law. As Walicki characterizes the change, "the new element in Chicherin's political views was his growing realization that political authority as such must be qualified and restricted, and that therefore he could no longer support the Hegelian doctrine of the unlimited sovereignty of the state." Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 137. For more on this intellectual evolution, see Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, 132-139,
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77 Chicherin, Filosofia prava, 259.

78 In his Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism, the chapter on Chicherin is subtitled “the ‘Old Liberal’ Philosophy of Law” and the chapter on Soloviev is subtitled “Religious Philosophy and the Emergence of the ‘New Liberalism.’”

79 For further development see my chapter, “Vladimir Solov’ev’s Philosophical Anthropology: Autonomy, Dignity, and Perfectionability,” in HRP, 131-149.

80 In Critique of Abstract Principles, Soloviev closely paraphrases and directly translates large parts of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. See Kritika ovrolechënných nachal, in Sobraniye sochenii Vladimir Sergeevicha Solov’eva, 2nd ed., edited by S. M. Soloviev and E. L. Radlov, 10 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1911-1914), 2: 44-62. In addition to these two chapters, he devotes three more, plus an appendix, to Kant’s ethics and conception of rational autonomy, drawing also on (paraphrasing and quoting at length) the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. See Sobraniye sochenii, 2: 62-72, 89-116, 371-397.


85 For further development, see my essay, “Kant and the Kingdom of Ends in Russian Religious Thought (Vladimir Solov’ev),” in Thinking Orthodox in Modern Russia: Culture, History, Context, edited by Patrick Lally Michelson and Judith Deutsch Kornblatt (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), 215-234.

86 Soloviev, Kritika ovrolechënných nachal, in Sobraniye sochenii, 2: 44.

88 Solov'yov, *The Justification of the Good*, 176 (translation modified); see also at 152.
95 For details, see Poole, "Kant and the Kingdom of Ends," 223-228.
96 In 1901, as he was planning *Problems of Idealism*, Struve published one of his most remarkable essays (and dedicated it to Soloviev), "What is True Nationalism?" For him, any true nationalism must rest on true liberalism, which demands "recognition of the inalienable rights of the person." P. Borisov [Struve], "V chem zhe istinnyi natsionalizm?" in *Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii* 12: 4, kn. 59 (1901): 493-528 (quoted phrase at 512); reprinted in his collection of articles, *Na raznye temy* (St. Petersburg, 1902), 526-555. For analysis see Richard Pipes, *Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 300-307.
97 John Stuart Mill is a good example. There were positivistic currents of Russian liberalism, too, represented most notably by Pavel Miliukov.
98 To quote one of these historians: Human rights, after their initial formulation in the Atlantic revolutions of the late eighteenth century, "almost disappeared from political and legal discourse in the nineteenth century." Human rights "in their specific contemporary connotations are a relatively recent invention." Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman, "Introduction: Genealogies of Human Rights," in *Human Rights in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman.
