

ЭТИЧЕСКОЕ ТВОРЧЕСТВО АНДЖЕЯ ГЖЕГОРЧИКА

Анджей Гжегорчик – логик, философ, этик

Анджей Гжегорчик (1922–2014) всю жизнь был связан с Варшавой. Интересовался логикой и математикой, написал известный в мире учебник «Основы математической логики» («*Zarys logiki matematycznej*»), переведенный на английский и французский языки. Во Франции он в течение многих лет использовался в качестве учебника логики. Гжегорчик также всегда занимался этикой. Областью его философских интересов был человек в контексте философской антропологии и аксиологии. Сам называл себя он «моралистом» и гордился этим.

Рациональная философия, открытая для ценностей

Гжегорчик был рационалистом, открытым для ценностей. Его рационализм был тесно связан с реализацией духовных ценностей. Говорил он, что человечность определяет как разум, так и открытость для ценностей. Писал о человеческой натуре, подчёркивая ценности, которые определяют выборы человека и его поведение. Ценности витальные (основные) и духовные (высшие) являются тем, что мотивирует действия человека.

Он видел ценности как шаблоны, регулирующие поведение человека. Нормы и ценности – это дорожные указатели, доступные и ясные на пути развития. Если человек выбирает исключительно витальные ценности, а его решения связаны с удовлетворением только основных инстинктов, то его жизнь поверхностна и не развивается. Но если он выбирает высшие ценности, старается выйти за пределы реализации основных потребностей, то его жизнь развивается, стремится к совершенному уровню и, к тому же, это хорошая жизнь. Переживание ценностей и реализация человечности – это ключи к мудрой жизни.

Схемы мышления

Гжегорчик утверждал, что жизни и культуре человека сопутствуют системы мышления. В каждой области науки человек создаёт определённые способы мышления, адекватные для данной этнической группы, соответствующие определённым представлениям и, как следствие, придающие определённый характер человеческой деятельности. Он ассоциировал системы мышления с конкретными группами людей, которые занимаются определёнными проблемами

и думают в соответствии с определёнными шаблонами. Они создают некие схемы мышления, мифы реальности.

Шаблоны мышления упорядочивают мышление, облегчают понимание различных явлений, организуют правила жизни и позволяют легче ориентироваться в мировоззренческих рамках мира. Познание различных систем мышления – это способность человека к развитию. Гжегорчик предостерегает, чтобы эти системы мышления, созданные в данной культуре, не были основанием для чувства превосходства. Шаблоны мышления могут также служить созданию определённых мифов относительно реальности. Такие мифы могут создавать своего рода угрозы в умах людей.

Системы мышления называл он «мегаинструментами разума». Таким образом, они могут создавать определённые угрозы в умах людей. Если мы поддаёмся и не контролируем выборы, которые совершаем, это будет приводить к подчинению неким ограничениям и к приспособлению с целью реализации витальных, а не духовных ценностей. Это означает отсутствие рефлексии относительно реальности, фиксирование только полезных для себя явлений и построение на них дальнейшего мышления и поведения.

Гжегорчик предостерегал против опасности того, что эти системы, созданные в определённой культуре, станут поводом считать людей, принадлежащих к этой культуре, как бы лучшими. Он призывал не подчиняться схемам мышления, а умело пользоваться тем, что даёт нам наука. Схемы мышления, мифы о реальности, тщеславие – это недостатки, которые не могут определять человечество; правильные черты ему придают, скорее, смирение и согласие с данным миром, а также критицизм в мышлении.

Другой так же важен, как и я

Для Гжегорчика человек был также важен в его общественных отношениях. Он творчески объединял рационалистическую традицию «приличного мышления» Львовско-варшавской школы с инновациями и влиянием христианства. Реализация духовных ценностей создаёт в человеке определённого рода уважение к каждому иному человеку. А признание других людей формирует позицию смирения по отношению к жизни и того, что принесла нам судьба. Философ показывал, что отношение к другим людям следует из отношения к самому себе. Он рассматривал вопрос важности другого человека в позиции смирения – позиции равенства и даже позиционирования себя ниже, чем другого.

Гжегорчик опирался на учение своего учителя Тадеуша Котарбинского, который писал о достойной жизни, полной добрых и практических шагов, совершающихся в повседневности. Он также

настаивал на том, что этика должна быть функциональной и полезной, а не оставаться только в сфере научных спекуляций.

Философия диалога в методе non-violence

Гжегорчик был сторонником разрешения конфликтов методом *non-violence*, в котором важен диалог, договор, взаимопонимание. Этот метод концентрируется на человеке как субъекте, который в конфликтных ситуациях способен пойти на компромисс и избежать эгоистического поведения. Парадоксально, что хотя сам он искал консенсуса, его убеждения в необходимости ненасильственности были бескомпромиссными.

Идея, которую он провозглашал, – это не только метод борьбы со злом, предполагающий отказ от насилия, но и своеобразная моральная позиция неучастия во зле. Она выражается, в частности, в отказе от борьбы с противником, в отношении к нему с уважением, открытостью, готовностью к диалогу. В этой позиции для человека одинаково важны как его собственные взгляды и ценности, так и взгляды и ценности другого. Это также понимание конфликта, распознавание ситуации, принятие во внимание добра «иного».

Кроме ссылок на философию ахимсы Ганди, тут можно найти связи с идеей Льва Толстого о непротавлении злу насилием, а также Тадеуша Котарбинского, который писал о сближении культур, возможном только благодаря избавлению от ошибочных суждений и опоре на факты.

ANDRZEJ GRZEGORCZYK'S WORKS IN ETHICS

Andrzej Grzegorzczak – logician, philosopher, ethicist

Andrzej Grzegorzczak (1922–2014) lived all his life in Warsaw. He was interested in logic and mathematics, which is expressed in the internationally recognized handbook of logic, *An Outline of Mathematical Logic*, translated into English and French¹. Grzegorzczak always directed his deliberations towards ethics. His area of philosophical interest was the human being – his behaviour and his nature – in the context of philosophical anthropology and axiology. He would define himself as a “moralist”, and was proud of it, too².

¹ In France, it was used as a textbook for teaching logic *Fonctions Récursives*. – S. Krajewski, *Andrzej Grzegorzczak (1922–2014)*, “Studia Semiotyczne” 2015, Tom XXVIII–XXXIX, p. 63–88.

² We can read all about it in the interview with Jacek Syski, *Czuwanie rozumu*, Czytelnik, Warszawa 1979, p. 65–76: “Jacek Syski: Critics call you a moralist who does not take into account realities and determinants. ‘The noble naïve’ – I am sorry

He was largely inspired by the philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School. He was a disciple of Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Maria and Stanisław Ossowski, he knew and assisted Władysław Tatarkiewicz in editing *Przełęcz Filozoficzny* (Philosophical Review). He excited interest on the part of his teachers. They referred to him as a person worthy of notice, with interesting views. He often entered into polemics with them, challenged their beliefs, discussed differences of opinion. He treated their scholarly output with respect and humility, creating a new dimension of philosophy himself. His innovative thinking, a combination of logical reasoning and ethical deliberations, created an interesting compilation of thought, philosophical conclusions, scholarly inspirations for further studies¹.

Rational philosophy open to values

He pointed out that a description of human nature implies a synthesis of a number of disciplines, where as a characterization of human nature must include reflection upon the culture of social life, valuing and development of an evaluation system (axiology). Therefore, I will try to present certain human condition in the world. “What I present to the reader, despite the term «ethics», is not a code of norms. It is much more of a certain vision of human existence. Of these of its aspects, in particular, which relate somehow to taking conscious actions and decisions as regards conduct”². Decision-taking should be an indicator of humanity. Decision-taking based on logical thinking, as well as ethical sensitivity. Hence, Grzegorzcyk can be identified as a rationalist open to values. “The philosophical school to which I refer places itself in the mainstream of the most broadly defined European rationalism that can be said to have originated in ancient Greece, being continued both by the medieval scholasticism and numerous philosophers and scholars of the modern age... European rationalism came in various guises. What I endeavour to take out of its rich tradition and propose may be called open rationalism,

for this expression... Andrzej Grzegorzcyk: The epithets do not hurt. I would like to print my business card: ‘the preacher of morals’... For clarity, I do not claim that ‘moralizing’ is easy and it cannot be done better than me. However, I cannot agree with general depreciation of this path of understanding with others or affecting to them, with this distrust of individual moral testimony and affirmation of the truth in the problems we face in daily living and cohabitation with other people”.

¹ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Logic – a human affair*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa, 1997. This is collection of articles and essays where he unambiguously combines logic and ethics in practice with human behaviour, even in the paper *Logical structures in anthropology*, where he shows inseparable connection among logic and morality as a component ordering the world of human decisions.

² A. Grzegorzcyk, *Etyka w doświadczeniu wewnętrznym*, PAX, Warszawa, 1989, p. 8.

more specifically: rationalism open to values”¹. In my opinion Grzegorzcyk wanted to present us that rationalism is founded on reason and it is important only when it consider realization of values. Especially spiritual values, which one really forming human. “Humanity is comprised of both reason and openness to values”².

Writing of human nature, he distinguished the values which describe human choices and behaviours. Vital values (basic) and spiritual ones (higher) are what motivates human actions. A person should strive after higher values, satisfy, choose and develop spiritual values. Vital values are just instincts of some kind (Grzegorzcyk describes them as common to the human being and animals)³. He presented values as a set of behaviours controlling human conduct. Norms and values are sign-posts, available and readable on the way of development. If a person chooses vital values only, and his decisions are connected with satisfying just the basic instincts, then his life is shallow, he does not develop. On the other hand, if he opts for higher values, seeks to go beyond realization of basic needs, his life develops, aims at a more perfect level, and, besides, is good. Experiencing values and realization of humanity are the key to a wise life.

Describing values, Grzegorzcyk, above all, defines them as something that people appreciate as such, not as a means to an end. Decisions that a person takes in his life, guided by specific values, facilitate self-fulfilment, and the person educates himself and develops in this way. Sensitivity to values, as they occur, does not always foster agreement and easy decisions. There are situations when a conflict of spiritual and vital values hinders choice. Then, humanity is demonstrated by conscious acceptance of responsibility for one’s actions. Preference for spiritual values over vital ones teaches how to overcome comfort and selfishness. Uneasy choices shape personality and are a lesson in humility towards what fate has brought, as well as responsibility for one’s own actions, for social life. Difficult decisions offer some perspective to evaluate and reflect on one’s life, they help avoid automatisms and thinking patterns.

Thinking patterns

Grzegorzcyk claims that a person’s life and culture is accompanied by thinking patterns, which he calls ”megatools of the mind”⁴. In every

¹ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Życie jako wyzwanie. Wprowadzenie w filozofię racjonalistyczną*, Wydawnictwo IFIS PAN, Warszawa, 1995, p. 6.

² S. Krajewski, *Andrzej Grzegorzcyk (1922–2014)*, p. 78.

³ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Próba treściowego opisu świata wartości i jej etyczne konsekwencje*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo PAN, Wrocław, 1983.

⁴ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Psychiczna osobliwość człowieka*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa, 2003, p. 104-111.

field of knowledge, an individual creates certain ways of thinking, adequate for a given ethnic group, paying homage to certain ideas and, consequently, giving human action a specific character. Grzegorzczuk combines thinking systems with actual milieu, where people are occupied with specific problems and think according to specific solutions. These are certain thinking patterns, subordinated to the realization of the values that people decide on. Thinking patterns order thinking, implement facilitations to enable understanding of various phenomena, organize the rules of life and facilitate keeping oneself within the framework of the outlook upon the world. Learning various thinking systems is a person's developmental ability, where he goes out of the comfortable cognition, his "existing" patterns, in order to know something else, learn something new. Grzegorzczuk warns also that these thinking systems, created in a given culture, should not provide conditions for thinking of oneself as a better person.

These thinking patterns can also be a basis for the formation of certain myths of reality¹. They can create specific threats in human minds. When we surrender and there is no control over our choices, this will cause submission to some limitations and adjusting ourselves to realization of vital values, instead of spiritual ones. Accordingly, this means unreflective behaviour towards reality, taking note of only such phenomena that are beneficial to us, and building further thinking and actions on them. Misconception, lack of any communication and willingness to reach an agreement, through closing oneself within one's own culture and thinking of it as a better, richer, more influential one, through discrimination. This can, ultimately, result in distorting the understanding of what we want to convey, as well as aggression.

Submission to myths is, as Grzegorzczuk writes, submission to the comfort of life, choosing an easier, selfish life, inclined towards misun-

¹ Grzegorzczuk's theory is similar to Francis Bacon's theory of idols. Bacon listed what he called the idols (false images) of the mind. He described these as things which obstructed the path of correct scientific reasoning: Idols of the Tribe, Idols of the Cave, Idols of the Marketplace and Idols of the Theatre. These idols, in the methodology of science, should indicate of the sources of deformation of knowledge. Bacon pointed out that learning of deformations are necessary to remove the source of errors. When idols become aware, the person is able to avoid them in the future. – F. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, PWN, Warszawa, 1955. – However, Grzegorzczuk wrote about myths of reality in other context. Myths of reality can tell us about the world in which we live, about the ways we know and describe it. But myths of reality could also be used in human's life as a weapon which makes one culture closed to another, claims that your own way of thinking is the best. It leads to excessive pride and the superiority of one's own knowledge as compared with that of other people. – A. Grzegorzczuk, *Etyka w doświadczeniu wewnętrznym*, p. 243–265.

derstanding of the other party and total lack of developmental expectations towards oneself¹. At some point, a sophisticated fortress is created within the mind, which fosters self-satisfaction, but also lack of self-criticism. Contrary to a life-in-peace proposal, expectation of dialogue and understanding of another person, as well as seeking for better solutions of a better life, shared with each other. It is through continuous confrontation of our thoughts with others, discussion, adjusting our views that we have opportunity for development and creation of agreeable community (even globally).

Grzegorzcyk persuades that we should not surrender ourselves to thinking patterns, but make a skilful use of what science offers us. Thinking patterns, myths of the existing reality, pride – these are flaws which must not determine humanity. It is rather humility and acceptance of a given world, as well as a kind of critical thinking, that are appropriate attributes of humanity.

Another person is as important as me – an individual in the society

A person in social relations was important for Grzegorzcyk, too. He creatively combined the rationalist tradition of sound thinking of the Lvov-Warsaw School with innovations and Christian inspiration. Realization of spiritual values creates within a person a kind of respect to every other individual. And other beings' recognition shapes an attitude of humility towards life and what fate has given us². Humility, as opposed to pride, defined as defence of one's views, having a high opinion of oneself and a sense of superiority over others, is an attitude which prefers people's equality, and even locates oneself at a lower level than others³. Both attitudes can be verified very easily in an interaction with another person, for instance being in disagreement. Such a situation entails some kind of threat, which is criticism towards ourselves. It irritates us if someone does not agree. Grzegorzcyk proposes then a solution, either based on pride – where we close ourselves off to external stimuli, to other values than the ones previously adopted, as every change brings about diminishing ourselves in our own eyes. Or assumption of the attitude of humility, more difficult but open to discussion, admission that someone else can also be right as regards the existing reality from the point of view of his/her own experience, different from mine own, after

¹ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Życie jako wyzwanie. Wprowadzenie w filozofię racjonalistyczną*, p. 208–215.

² A. Grzegorzcyk, *Mala propedeutyka filozofii naukowej*, PAX, Warszawa, 1989, p. 58–60; A. Grzegorzcyk, *Życie jako wyzwanie*, p. 106–108.

³ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Tolerancja – pokonanie własnej psychy*, „Problemy opiekuńczo-wychowawcze”, 1995, no 7, in: *Przygotowanie do życia*, p. 2–3.

all. "Thus, humility tells me to perceive the interlocutor's utterances with care, impels to expand my own perspective, encourages to make an effort to build a new synthesis, such a view of affairs which comprises both my and his/her perception will be a cognitive gain for us both. The attitude of humility is, therefore, a starting point for intellectual reconciliation between opponents. But it demands internal effort from the one who assumes it"¹. He considers the question of another person's importance relying on Christian values. Not only on the principle "love your neighbour as yourself", but to the extent of "turning the other cheek". The attitude of humility towards another, as well as the whole life, is expressly related to the moral attitude of *non-violence*.

Relationships and good communication are essential to a person's social status. In this context, also paying attention to what is presently given to an individual, how actively this is experienced. Every situation is an unrepeatable decision, a moral challenge, which we must face through our choices and resolutions. Moral challenges create situations involving another person, and we cannot remain indifferent to them. Grzegorzczuk demonstrates that one's approach towards other people results from the attitude towards oneself². "Another person is a kind of a duplicate of myself, only exposed to other circumstances. His life problems would probably become my problems in his/her circumstances"³. Hence, the key to understanding another is taking certain responsibility not only for what one participates in, what decisions one takes, how one lives and how one exists socially. But becoming responsible for another, as he creates social life together with me.

The considerations show that the philosopher was deriving from the teachings of his professor, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who wrote of a worthy, full of good and practical actions – taken in everyday life⁴. The life and choices that we make verify our identity. It is not necessary to pursue lifetime bests, rather conscientious fulfilment of the tasks as entrusted. "Every man, on the other hand, whether being distinguished by skills or rather approximating average values, adheres to his good right, if he treats the maxim of being himself as a defensive one: do not allow the automatism of social relations or other forces, blindly suppressing, to ruin the individual values that one has. *This summarizes itself in the postulate of human dignity, but culminates in the right to one's own ethical*

¹ Ibid., p. 3.

² Ibid., p. 2–3.

³ A. Grzegorzczuk, *Schematy i człowiek. Szkice filozoficzne*, Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak, Warszawa, 1963, p. 189.

⁴ T. Kotarbiński, *Żyć zacnie*, [w:] Idem, *Żyć zacnie*, selection by Teresa Duraliska-Macheta, Nasza Księgarnia, Warszawa, 1989, p. 43–56.

judgement, in which no one can ever replace anyone” (emphasis mine. – L.M.)¹.

Philosophy of dialogue in the non-violence method

Grzegorzcyk supported conflict resolution by means of the *non-violence* method, in which dialogue, agreement, understanding of the other party are important. A dictionary of politics defines the idea of *non-violence*, as “a strategy of political fight consisting in the renouncement of violence or threats thereof under all conditions and circumstances”². *Non-violence* is also the basis of all forms of civil disobedience and refusal to abide by laws which are considered unfair, as the actions described by Henry David Thoreau³.

Non-violence is a certain method of fighting and, using Grzegorzcyk’s words, also an attitude towards another person. An attitude open to dialogue, respect towards another and belief that the other person is just as important. Grzegorzcyk understands *non-violence* as something more than an idea and a method of fighting only within the system of a state. It is a moral standing refusing to partake in evil, as well as giving up on being right in favour of a relation with another person. It is an attitude of nonfighting an opponent but holding him in high esteem and being open, ready for dialogue and understanding. According to this standing, an individual equally cares for his reasons, thinking, and the cause of the other party. It is also willing to find a way of the conflict for which both parties are co-responsible. Skilful recognition of a situation and understanding the arguments of the other, hearing out and building common grounds for proposed solutions to difficult situations, taking note of the good of “another”. The situation of cooperation is more difficult than the situation of a conflict. In the latter, everyone minds their own business, whereas the attitude of collaboration and understanding takes the effort of empathizing with others⁴.

Grzegorzcyk’s views demonstrate a number of references to the Gandhi’s philosophy *ahimsa*⁵. *Non-violence* is a way of life, in which the

¹ T. Kotarbiński, *Hasło: Bądź sobą!* [w:] Idem, *Życie zacnie*, p. 128.

² *Słownik Polityki*, ed. M. Bankowicz, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa, 1996, p. 169.

³ H. D. Thoreau, *Walden and Civil disobedience*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1986.

⁴ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Działania pokojowe a postawy etyczne*, „Studia Philosophiae Christianae”, 1989, no 25, p. 146.

⁵ *Ahimsa* is one of the cardinal virtues and an important tenet of Jainism (this concept reached an extraordinary status in the ethical philosophy of Jainism), Hinduism, and Buddhism. *Ahimsa* is a multidimensional concept, inspired by the premise that all living beings have the spark of the divine spiritual energy; therefore, to hurt

Divine exists in each living being. It is the everyday practice of wisdom, where what counts is love, inherent respect to other living beings and truth is the supreme goal.

Connections can also be found with the ideas of Leo Tolstoy, his reception of non-responding to evil with violence and the concept of religious anarchism. Although anarchism dominated Tolstoy's views, it was the peaceful one. He did not postulate any concept of revolution, or killing, even for good cause, but appealed for giving up violence in the name of love¹. "Repayment with evil for evil does not educate but corrupts. Respond with good to evil and you will destroy the satisfaction with evil in a mean person"². What is more, Tolstoy desired that people undergo moral transformation. And this cannot be achieved by resorting to violence. Hence, Tolstoy insisted on learning not to wrong people, so as to make one's life better among them³. Anarchy for Tolstoy is a kind of freedom from pressure from any institutions, including church and state ones. He did not opt, even in the context of revolution, for killing revolutionists, but for repaying them with love for the evil deeds they had committed. Every person should follow the principles of the Gospel and the right of love, but not necessarily be subordinated to the Church.

Thence Grzegorzczuk's conclusions, more than a hundred years later after Tolstoy, yet of similar Christian origin. And though the idea of *non-violence is*, in its common understanding, still related to statehood and citizenship, in a wider perspective it inspires people with peacekeeping and non-responding to evil with evil, also in everyday moral situations. Grzegorzczuk expands the understanding of this idea not only as a way of fighting and method of acting, but to make it a part of a person's attitude to life.

Grzegorzczuk's conclusions show also inspirations with the philosophy of Tadeusz Kotarbiński, who wrote that cultures are brought together only and exclusively because we give up misjudgements and derive our knowledge from facts. Moreover, regarding the delicate issue of mutual

another being is to hurt oneself. *Ahimsa* has also been related to the notion that any violence has karmic consequences. This name means "not to injure" and "compassion" and refers to a key virtue in Indian religions. *Ahimsa* is also referred to as non-violence.

¹ J. Uglik, *Michała Bakunina filozofia negacji*, Wydawnictwo Aletheia, Warszawa, 2007, p. 63; L. N. Tolstoy, *Aforyzmy* (Афоризмы), transl. by M. Biernacka and A. Rażny, PIW, Warszawa, 1978, p. 64.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31–32.

³ J. Uglik, *Michała Bakunina filozofia negacji*, p. 64; L. N. Tolstoy, *Aforyzmy*, p. 32.

relations, one should concentrate on objective argumentation, seeking common interest, and not divisions¹.

This idea focuses on a person as an individual who, in conflict situations, is able to compromise and dispose of selfish behaviours. Paradoxically, Grzegorzczuk was looking for consensus himself, his views regarding *non-violence* were uncompromising. For this stance, as an element of education, derives from Christian values. He points out that a person is extremely important in ethical considerations and what counts is choosing the good values, compliancy and lack of bad ambition. Another person is just as important as I am. Humility and tolerance are determinants of good interrelations, which leads to building good social relations. This is an attitude which is expressed in everyday dealings, choices made according to the principle of “turning the other cheek” or placing every other person and his problems on the same level. Seeking dialogue and a way to meet halfway in order to create a better world to live in. “Every person presents a value incomparable to the value of another person, therefore no one can be harmed in an essential way for the good of another. Every evil ever done to anyone must be opposed, and fighting evil one should not do it oneself”².

Final reflection

Summing up, Grzegorzczuk, despite being a logician, focused his considerations on anthropological issues. He was looking for practical implementations of ethics into everyday life. He pointed out, through values, treating others well, a specific moral attitude expressed by the idea of *non-violence*, that it is a person who is important, and his own development, improvement. In addition, if a person can live a good life for himself, then he will be able to live a good life with others, will create new standards of social life. He was seeking agreement between people regarding social issues. He saw the threats of the contemporary world, threats for an individual, for the society and for the entire world. That is why he insisted on ethics being functional and useful, and not only remaining a subject of scholarly divagations. He searched for practical solutions to be responsible for the time, the life we have been given and try to build a better present.

¹ T. Kotarbiński, *Pokój – nasza nadzieja*, [w:] Ibidem, *Pisma etyczne*, Ossolineum, Wrocław, 1987, p. 259–260.

² A. Grzegorzczuk, *Filozofia czasu próby*, PAX, Warszawa, 1984, p. 150.